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Zhou Enlai Perceived: An Assessment of his Diplomacy
at the Geneva Confer^ce of 1954 (96 pp.
Director: Philip West
Zhou Enlai, the first Foreign Minister and the longtime premier
of the People's Republic of China, made a considerable contribution
to the establishment and development of a distinctive Chinese
diplomacy, in both theory and practice. His legacy includes his
diplomatic debut at Geneva, and his prominent role in China's
tumultuous relations with the United States and the former Soviet
Union.
In 1954, Zhou made his diplomatic debut at the Geneva Conference
on the settlement of the Indochina War. Throughout the conference,
Zhou's approach to international issues revealed that he committed
himself to the standard norms and tenets of diplomacy: persuasion,
compromise, reciprocity and, if necessary, the use of force. His
active and flexible diplomacy confirmed that he pursued China's
security and its own legitimate interests in a manner consistent
with the rules of the international stability.
The author of this thesis made an effort to trace the historical
sources in which Zhou developed his intellectual concept of world
politics and diplomacy. The thesis revealed that Zhou and his
generation as well prized such Western principles as national selfdetermination, sovereignty, reciprocity and equality, and they
attempted to turn Western ideologies and diplomatic norms into a
Chinese approach to diplomacy, which would accomplish China's
purposes. With this knowledge of diplomacy, Zhou successfully
impressed the world-level diplomats at Geneva and played an
important, and in some cases, even a crucial role in the final
settlement of the Indochina conflict.
However, at the same time, the thesis also points out that
Zhou's diplomacy at Geneva should be assessed appropriately.
Although he was accepted as one of the first-class diplomats of the
20th century, Zhou's view on world politics was pointedly MarxistLeninist. He obtained his understanding of world politics and
diplomacy from a historical context in which China was dominated by
the Western powers. Therefore, Zhou was extremely sensitive to
unequal and non-reciprocal treatment in diplomacy. Such a sense did
not conform with Zhou's ideal of international equality in world
politics. Zhou's role at Geneva should also be assessed properly in
terms of China's domestic politics at that time, in which his views
were always subordinat to those of Mao. In brief, as a
controversial figure in China's history, Zhou and his diplomacy
need further exploration.
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INTRODUCTION

In the annals of China's diplomacy of the twentieth-century, Zhou
Enlai, the first Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC),
deserves particular attention. He belonged to a small group of
statesmen who represented the establishment of the P.R.C. and who
left

a lasting imprint on the Chinese political scene. That

political elite included Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Among them,
however, Zhou stood out as the one who exercised a formative and
powerful influence over China's diplomacy from the birth of the PRC
in 1949 until his death in 1976.
Zhou's former aides and retired Chinese diplomats have unanimou
sly recalled that, although he ranked second only to Chairman Mao
in the formulation of Beijing's foreign policy. Premier Zhou was
actually the founder of China's diplomacy.^ As the first Foreign
Minister and the longtime Premier of China, Zhou participated in
all of the major foreign policy-making and diplomatic activities.
His legacy is embodied in his prominent role in-China's tumultuous
relations with the United States and the former Soviet Union. Zhou
made his diplomatic debut at the 1954 Geneva Conference at which he
played an important role in the settlement of the Indochina War.^

^ See Pei Jianzhang, ed., Yanjiu Zhou Enlai waijiao sixiang he
shijian (Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought & Practice),
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989), pp. 363; and Qian Qichen,
ed., Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (The Winds and Clouds of New
China's Diplomacy) 3 voles. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe,
1991), pp. 542.
^ The Geneva Conference of 1954 was the first international
conference at which China attended with other major powers to
discuss a peaceful resolution in Indochina.
1

During his tenure, his statesmanship epitomized the foundation and
development of a distinctive Chinese diplomacy, both in theory and
practice, which continues to the present day. In the words of Qian
Qichen, the PRC's current Foreign Minister:
"Premier Zhou fully deserves to be honored as the founder
and preceptor of new China's diplomacy, to which he made
the most outstanding contribution in an all-round way
during his 26-year tenure as a [foreign] policy maker,
coinmander, and practitioner.... His expositions on world
politics and diplomacy are accepted as the theoretical
basis of Chinese foreign policy today.
Given his influential role in Chinese foreign relations, it is
important to understand the intellectual development of Zhou Enlai's approach to international diplomacy. There have been numerous
Chinese biographies and writings on Zhou and his diplomacy.'® In
particular, recently-published memoirs by Chinese diplomats have
confided to the public what they thought to be Zhou's diplomatic
thought and style.^ With few exceptions, however, Chinese accounts
have not yet moved beyond the "personality cult" treatment which
regarded Zhou as the consummate diplomatist. For instance, Wang
^ Qian Qichen, "Renzhen yanjiu Zhou Enlai de waijiao sixiang
he shijian" (On how to seriously study Zhou Enlai's diplomatic
thought and practice) in Studies on Zhou Enlai, ed., p. 4.
* For example, Percy J. Fang & Lucy J. Fang, Zhou Enlai-A
Profile. (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 1986); Wang Bingnan, "Zhongmei
huitan huigu," Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks in Retrospect),
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985); and Kuokang Shao, "Zhou
Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indochina, 1954-55,"
The China Quarterly, No. 107 (September 1986), pp. 483-504, etc.
^ See Pei Jianzhang, ed.. Studies on Zhou Enlai--Diplomatic
Thought and Practice; and Qian Qichen, ed.. The Winds and Clouds of
New China's Diplomacy. 3 voles. These two books collected the
papers written by 62 former diplomatic officials, Zhou's aides, and
diplomatic scholars who involved in Zhou's diplomatic activities
(1950-1975).
2

Bingnan, a senior aide of Zhou in 1954 and Qu Xing, a diplomatscholar, praised the Premier's "always correct" judgments, his
notable wisdom and his realistic diplomatic style. But no one has
seriously touched on Zhou's personal reflections on world politics
and the nature of diplomacy in the conflict-ridden international
system.®
Western journalistic and academic writings on Zhou's diplomacy
have abounded as well.^ As early as 1954, TIME magazine called Zhou
"the great dissembler" and described his job as making China seem
bigger and more formidable than it was or could be for some time to
come.® In the 1960s, Kenneth Young, a former U.S. ambassador to
Thailand, wrote, "Zhou is essentially the consxammate political
man.... who has spent his entire adult life working to increase
Chinese Communist influence in the world."® He made an effort to
touch on a combination of communist ideology and nationalistic
interest that determined Zhou's intellectual concept of world
politics. Nevertheless, Young's analysis focused mainly on Zhou's
style and his undisputed role in China's foreign policy.
® Qu Xing, "Shilun yijiuwusinian rineiwahuiyishang de Zhou Enlai waijiao," (On Zhou's Diplomacy at the 1954 Geneva Conference)
in Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought and Practice, pp. 245268; and Wang Bingnan, "Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks," pp. 1-89.
^ See Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Bioaraphv (New York: Viking
Penguin Inc. 1984); John Roots, Chou: An Informal Biography (New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1978); Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of
Zhou Enlai (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1989); and Kenneth
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: McGrawHill Press, 1968).
® TIME, May 10, 1954, p. 32.
® Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 408.
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In recent years, Ronald Keith, a Canadian scholar, provided a
historical and theoretical framework in which to understand Zhou's
diplomacy. He argued that the influence of Chinese classical
thought and strategy, the entwining of modern Chinese nationalism
and communism, and the thrust of contemporary Chinese politics
"made up the style and the substance of Zhou's diplomacy."^® But
Keith did not analyze convincingly how Zhou acquired and developed
his outlook on world politics from those three intellectual and
situational dimensions.
The biographies and the writings on Zhou's diplomacy, Chinese
and non-Chinese, are helpful in understanding Zhou Enlai. Yet, they
have paid scant attention to a fundamental question: why did Zhou
try to pursue the goals of China's security and legitimacy through
a "rational", instead of a revolutionary, diplomacy during the
period prior to its admission to the United Nations in 1972 when
China was an isolated, revolutionary power? In order to address
this essential question on the attributes of Zhou's diplomacy, this
thesis will attempt to probe his perception of world politics and
the diplomacy he defined and tried to implement in the 1950s.
For that purpose, the thesis will refer to Zhou's own words as
revealed in his manuscripts as well as China's diplomatic documents
in order to reveal how Zhou perceived world politics and how he
defined diplomacy in the international system of the Cold War. I
argue that Zhou's pragmatic diplomacy stemmed from his realistic

Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 3-4.
4

perception of world politics during the Cold War.^^ Historically,
Zhou derived his perception from two intertwined sources: modern
China's contact with the West and the Chinese new generations'
response to the Western impact. The influence of the West included
liberal ideas such as national self-determination, sovereignty, and
equality between states. Also involved were communist views on
colonialism, imperialism, war, and diplomacy. No matter if they
served the Chinese Communists or Nationalists, the competing ideas
of the West exerted a deep influence on modern China and inevitably
molded the views on world affairs of the Zhou's generation. As Teng
Ssuyu and John K. Fairbank, two scholars of modern Chinese history,
pointed out:
"Modern China, including the communist rise to power
there, can be understood only against the background of
its contact with the West.... The origin and growth of
these forces--nationalism, party dictatorship, the
worship of technology, and emancipation of women--all
these are new elements inspired mainly by Western
contact. "
Zhou's intellectual concept of world politics and diplomacy
emerged and developed in the tumultuous context of China's contact
with the West from the late nineteenth-century to the early decades
of the twentieth-century.

See Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, (Beijing:
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), Pei Jianzhang, ed., Studies on
Zhou Enlai-Diolomatic Thought and Practice; Qian Qichen, ed., 3
voles. The Winds and Clouds of New China's Diplomacy; and Han
Nianlong, ed., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, Contemporary China's
Diplomacy (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1989).
Teng Ssuyu & John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the WestA Documentary Survey 1839-1923 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1972) p. 2.
5

This thesis, however, does not purport to be an exhaustive and
definitive treatment of Zhou's diplomatic thought and his entire
career. It will limit itself to an assessment of his diplomatic
debut at the Geneva Conference. One of the reasons for this focus
is that the Geneva Conference of 1954 was the first international
conference at which China attended with the other major powers the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union - during
the heyday of the Cold War in 1954. The Geneva Conference was
expected to relax tensions in Korea and Indochina. Beijing was not
only proud of its presence at the Geneva Conference but also of its
significant role in concluding an accord on the peaceful settlement
of the Indochina war. As Robert Randle, a scholar of foreign
affairs, put it, the Geneva Conference offered China the means for
playing the role of a great power and... it was determined enough
to demand a major role in world affairs.
During the 1954 Geneva Conference, Zhou also sought to improve
the Chinese security and to establish its legitimacy by diplomacy.
His active and flexible approach to the Indochina issue revealed
that he committed himself to the standard norms and principles of
diplomacy: persuasion, compromise, reciprocity and, if necessary,
the use of force. As Kenneth Young later wrote, "Zhou maneuvered
imaginatively. Always striving to enhance the status and power of
the Chinese People's Republic, he used flexible tactics and various
gambits to try to manipulate various agreements out of the Western

" R. Randle, Geneva 1954: the Settlement of the Indochinese
War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 551.
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powers [including the United States]."^^
Finally, in his conduct of diplomacy at the Geneva Conference,
Zhou pursued China's national interest in a manner not inconsistent
with the rules of international stability.In 1954, he stated the
"two camps" doctrine was not conducive to relaxing international
tensions. Thus, he began to reiterate five principles of peaceful
co-existence as a basis of conducting relations among states with
different social systems in the bipolar Cold War,^® As Qu Xing, a
diplomat-scholar concluded, Zhou's conduct of diplomacy and his
proposals in the mid-1950s represented "the essential traits of his
diplomacy and his real thinking on the nature of world politics and
the function of diplomacy."^''
Before turning the spotlight on Zhou's diplomacy at the Geneva
Conference of 1954, it is appropriate to build a historical frame
work in which his intellectual growth and diplomatic career can be
understood.

Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 17.
Fairbank observed, "At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Zhou
Enlai joined' the foreign ministers of the other powers in an effort
to create stability in Indochina as- France withdrew." in The United
States and China. 4th ed., (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1983) p. 406.
The five principles are: mutual respect for each other's
territorial integrity and sovereignty; Nonaggression; Noninter
ference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful
co-existence, see "Heping gongchu wuxiangyuanze, " in Selected Works
of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 63.
Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 268.
7

Chapter I.
The Sources of Zhou's Perception of World Politics

Zhou Enlai developed his intellectual concept of world politics and
diplomacy in the historical context of modern China's contact with
the West and, in turn, of the Chinese response toward the Western
impact. When Zhou was born in 1898, China under the Qing government
had been overrun by the Western powers and, by then, Japan as well.
Beginning with the Opium War (1839-42),^® China had succumbed to a
series of foreign attacks each of which was concluded with an
"unequal treaty" that required the Qing government to pay an
indemnity and to concede privileges, rights, and territory to the
victorious power.The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 once again
revealed a China too weak to refuse anyone anything.^® Under such
historical circumstances, Zhou and his generation were destined to"
seek to understand the West and Japan, and to probe the ways to
reinvigorate old China with new spirit.
The Opium War was a notable turning point in Chinese history.
The weakness laid bare by the British gunboats in the wake of the
dispute over the opium trade inevitably in time forced on the Qing
rulers a severe choice: the Qing court's extinction or the adoption
The modern phase of China's contact with the West was
inauspiciously opened by the Opium War (1839-42), in which the Qing
empire was forced to accept the treaties system dictated by the
Western powers.
Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution. (New Heaven, CT, Yale
University Press), p. 4.
This war was fought between the Qing empire and Japan
throughout 1894-95, resulting in China's conceding Taiwan to Japan
according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
8

of the Western learning. After nearly two decades of confusion,
debates,

and

domestic

chaos,

the

leading

Manchu and Chinese

officials of the Qing court became convinced that imitating and
adopting Western devices and institutions was a matter of survival.
The simple line of reasoning in the scholar-officials' minds was
that Western techniques were superior and therefore, the Chinese
must learn and use these devices for defense. The slogan of the day
became "Learn the science and technology of the barbarians in order
to control them.

From this emerged the Yangwu (literally. Western

affairs) or the "Self-Strengthening Movement" as it was commonly
known in the West. The Yangwu, which started in 1861 with the early
promise, represented that Chinese scholar-officials clung to "the
fallacy of halfway Westernization, in tools but not in values.
In the following decades (from 1860 to 1895), the Qing regime
indeed made definite progress in adopting the Western learning from science and technology to modern diplomatic practice. In 1861,
the Zongli Yamen (the Foreign Office of the Qing regime), was
created after the European model. This creation, in the words of
Masataka Banno, a Japanese scholar, marked a turning point in
modern China's foreign relations.^^

This proposal was initiated in the 1840s by Wei Yuan, a
scholar-official, see John K. Fairbank and E.G. Reischauer, China;
Tradition and Transformation. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1973), p. 309.
Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 196.
Masataka Banno, China and the West, 1858-1861; the Origins
of Zongli Yamen (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964),
p. 2.
9

First, it was the end of traditional world order defined by
China and of its old perception of world affairs. According to the
traditional, self-central Chinese world order, the relations of
China with non-Chinese were hierarchic and nonegalitarianAfter
the Opium War, however, the Qing court of China began to adjust
itself to a new international order dominated by the West. Since
1861, the Chinese government learned to handle the diplomatic
disputes with foreign powers according to European legal norms,
such as sovereignty, juridical equality, and mutual respect for
territory. In 1864, for the first time, the diplomatic officials of
the Zongli Yamen acquired their successful experience in the appli
cation of Western international law. Despite their early rudiments,
the diplomats of the Qing court conducted negotiations with the
Prussian Minister, von Rehfues, and obtained his concessions on a
maritime issue.
Also in 1864, Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law was
translated into Chinese by an American missionary, W.A.P. Martin.
Prince Gong, the de facto head of the Zongli Yamen, gave an order
to deliver three hundred copies to local officials for reference.
By the late nineteenth century, the phrases, such as international
law, diplomatic equality, mutual respect for sovereignty - ideas

John K. Fairbank, ed.. The Chinese World Order, (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 2. But, Professor Yang
Liansheng argued, "Politically and militarily, in several periods,
China recognized neighboring peoples as equal adversaries." ibid.,
p. 20.
Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of
Nations. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 123.
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learned from the West to use in argument with the West - began to
appear here and there in state papers.^® However, primarily, the
Yangwu facilitated the regular diplomatic contact between China and
the West and involved China in an international system dominated by
the Western powers.
In spite of this progress in the application of international
law, European diplomatic norms, and modern manufacturing, up to the
1890s, Western cultural impact remained singularly marginal on the
Chinese scholarly world. Chinese education remained oriented to the
Chinese classical doctrines. Little had been done in the past three
decades of Sino-Western contact to facilitate the intellectual
communication between the Chinese literati and their counterparts
of the West. Although the Tongwen Guan (literally, interpreters'
school) had been set up in Beijing in 1862, its task was to train
diplomatic officials and interpreters with subjects focusing on
European diplomatic norms, law, and foreign languages. As Fairbank
wrote, with an American missionary as head and a couple of foreign
teachers and with the prompting and support of Sir Robert Hart, a
British official, this new college soon had over one hundred Manchu
and Chinese students of foreign languages and international law.
Yet this innovation had to be defended vigorously against the
attack of anti-foreign literati who objected to the teaching of
Western subjects.^'
As late as 1894, in Chinese-sponsored schools, there was almost
Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 4.
Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 199.
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no place for so-called "Western learning", such as the Western
history, geography, and other social sciences. This amounted to an
intellectual insulation of the Chinese literati. Thus, the majority
of Chinese gentry-literati still lived in the mental universe of
their own tradition.^® They became aware of their intellectual
obscuration only when national crisis was imminent.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 completely crushed the pride
and complacency of the Chinese scholar-officials. This event was
historically significant in two aspects. First of all, it proved
that thirty years' efforts by the Qing government in the Yangwu
were incomplete and therefore resulted in a tragic end. Second, it
surprised Chinese scholar-officials that China could be defeated by
Japan, formerly a cultural borrower from China but now Westernized.
National crisis was accompanied by a sense of cultural crisis. The
dual crises inevitably led the Chinese to question not only the
institutional legitimacy of the entire traditional political order
but also the tradition per se. Chinese culture was subject to
reinterpretation and even renunciation. As a Chinese scholar Jerome
Chen said, "Confucian confidence had gone and China was open to the
penetration of foreign ideologies."^®
The first wave of the Western ideologies penetrating into China
in the wake of national crises were various political and social
doctrines including early Marxism, anarchism, liberalism and modern

Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System 1918-1920.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 24.
Cf. ibid., p. 25.
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nationalism.Among them, the most appealing was nationalism and
sovereignty. Since 1900, national self-determination and sovereign
rights seemed to appear on nearly every page one read and aroused
the Chinese as a nationalistic consciousness.
Since the Yangwu era dated from the 1860s, China exposed itself
to the influence of the Western values and norms. But most of them
were specific, legal codes and diplomatic norms, rather than
intellectual theories. These Western ideas were used conveniently
in the negotiations with foreign powers when diplomatic issues
arose. Only in the 1900s, did the Western ideas along with dynamic
nationalism spread rapidly throughout the entire China. Western
culture, including both natural science and social science, was
introduced and pursued in all new schools. These new schools were
either funded by the Western missionaries or were co-founded in
accordance with the Western models. Nankai Middle School where Zhou
Enlai pursued his education during 1913-17 was established along
the lines of the Philips Academy model.
In these Western-model schools, the Chinese students were eager
to be exposed to and then accepted a faith in Western values. They
were determined to organize a modern, centralized nation-state,
capable of restoring China's sovereignty and reinvigorating China
with new political, social, economic, and cultural aspirations.^^
Michael Gasster's "The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism-1906-1907," in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution, pp. 67-97.
Chae-jin Lee, Zhou Enlai-The Early Years, (Stanford Univer
sity Press, 1994), p. 50.
Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 4.
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This new, educated elite was in many ways the most important group
to gain prominence in the future politics of China. Up to the end
of 1910s, Chinese students, and youth generally, were excited over
the prospect of China's continued reform along Western values and
norms, arguing that China would in time be accepted by the Western
powers as an equal member in the international system. However, the
faith of China's youth in the Western liberalism was shattered to
dust by 1919.
The year of 1919 was a watershed in the Chinese history. At that
time, internally, Chinese parliamentary institutions based on the
Western models were manipulated by corrupt officials and greedy
warlords. The young Republic, which replaced the Qing regime in
1912, lacked the necessary authority and efficiency in nationbuilding. This result greatly discredited Western political values.
Externally, the European powers did not fully recognize China's
status, even though it abided by international law and obligations.
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the great powers once again
ignored China's appeal for its territorial integrity. The Chinese
were shocked by the news that the Western powers had denied China's
appeals. Reflecting their resentment, the patriotic youth of China
initiated nationwide demonstrations, strikes, and press campaigns
on May 4th 1919. The "May Fourth Movement", as it was later called,
represented the massive" Chinese nationalism primarily concerned
with the survival of China as a nation-state.^^
After the Opium War of the 1840s, and in particular since the
Y.J. Zhang, China in the International System, pp. 74-76.
14

turn of the century, the Chinese intellectuals kept seeking an
answer or a means of resistance to the expansion of the Western
powers which by now included Japan, into China. The "May Fourth
Movement" was a reflection of the continuing agonizing concern of
Chinese new generation with the debilitation and dislocation of
China

in

the

international system

even after

their complete

perceptual change of the world. However, internal chaos, external
humiliations and intellectual frustration - all of these elements
combined - turned many Chinese intellectuals, especially the young,
radical ones, against their early faith in the Western liberalism
and toward Marxism-Leninism by the end of the 1910s.
Under such circumstances, Lenin's theory of the oppressing
powers in the West and the oppressed nations in the East provided
a plausible explanation for China's failure to achieve its rightful
claims in the diplomatic arena.According to Lenin's theory of
world politics, nation-states, the basic unit of the international
system, were dominated by classes having political power based on
their economic ownership. Thus, class struggle became the law of
society. Imperialism, as a social stage, was exclusively an outcome
of the monopoly capitalism of the West. Capitalist monopolies were
bent on exporting surplus capital and investing it in underdevelop
ed areas of the world for greater profits. The unceasing drive for
colonies and markets in a world, almost partitioned by the Western

Benjamin Schwartz, "Chinese Perception of World Order, Past
and Present," in J.K. Fairbank, ed.. The Chinese World Order, pp.
276-290; and Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 10-23.
15

powers, led inevitably to international imperialist wars for the
'redistribution' of colonies as well as to intensified national
independent struggle in colonies or semi-colonies.^^ Accordingly,
the people and nations in colonies or semi-colonies played a
significant role in the revolutionary struggle against capitalist
powers. To achieve this end, according to Lenin, a disciplined
elite and "democratic-centralist" party must assume the leadership
of the revolution.^®
Lenin's theory of class struggle and his analysis of Western
imperialism, along with his renunciation of the special privileges
extorted from China by tsarist Russia, had particular appeal among
young, patriotic students in China. As Harold Hinton observed, "It
was not only Chinese tradition that had become discredited; so to
a large extent had its Western liberal alternative."^'' The impact
of Marxism-Leninism on the Chinese intellectuals became significant
after the "May Fourth Movement" of 1919.
Zhou Enlai was a student during those years. Between 1913 and
1917, he studied at Nankai Middle School and pursued education in
western history, world geography, and political theories such as
Rousseau's "Social Contract," Montesquieu's "Spirit of Law," and
Huxley's "Evolution." Like other Nankai graduates, Zhou acquired a
broad range of knowledge from Nankai's Westernized and innovative

R.R, Palmer & J. Colton, A History of the Modern World. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1984), p. 704.
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp. 10-22.
Ibid., p. 12.
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academic programs. As John Roots wrote, "Zhou's whole Nankai career
was an incredible tour de force-a clear indication of the shape of
things to come,"^® Four decades later, Zhou as the premier the PRC
recalled, "I still thank Nankai school for the enlightening basic
education that enabled me to pursue knowledge further."^®
Zhou was initially exposed to Marxism-Leninism in Japan.''® But
he began to accept communist theory during his stay in Europe from
1920 to 1924. At that time, Zhou, like many student nationalists of
the 1920s, looked to the West, the home of Marxism, for an explana
tion of China's desperate condition of internal chaos and external
contempt. Zhou acquired his revolutionary vision in Paris, London,
and Berlin. Although no record has been found that Zhou enrolled in
any European school, his exposure to living in Europe broadened
Zhou's horizons in regard to world affairs, political activities,
and Marxist-Leninist theories. This new awareness made him wellprepared to assume a key position of political and intellectual
leadership in Chinese politics when he returned home in 1924. Also
in Europe, Zhou found communism compatible with his nationalistic
and idealistic orientations. He believed that Marxism, especially
Lenin's theory of imperialism, was an appropriate and convenient
means of achieving China's long-aspired national salvation.
Roots, Zhou: An Informal Biography, p. 17.
Wilson, Zhou Enlai; A Biography, p. 36.
Zhou's two years in Japan were in many ways very limited
although he early was exposed to the Russian revolution of 1917
there. See Chae-jin Lee, Zhou Enlai, pp. 115-116.
" Ibid., p. 175.
17

More important, Zhou observed firsthand the social and political
crisis in Europe. He also witnessed the domestic and international
implications of the Russian revolution led by Lenin. His writings
at that time revealed an appreciation of Lenin's realism and
flexibility in his overtures to Western great powers in the post
war era. As Ronald Keith wrote that Zhou admired Lenin for signing
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Geianany and for his diplomatic
overtures to the West. This was in fact a case of "uniting a high
degree of flexibility with a high degree of principle" - a unity
which was to become Zhou's own lifelong credo in foreign affairs.
Zhou prized the principles and language of European diplomacy,
such as sovereign rights, national self-determination and mutual
respect for territory. He regarded diplomacy as a means to achieve
the end of national interest. At the same time, Zhou also adopted
Marxist-Leninist theories on world politics. According to MarxistLeninist doctrines, world politics was the external expression of
internal class conflicts, accordingly, world wars were the result
of imperialist powers seeking to avert their domestic social crises
and competing for the overseas markets. Thus Zhou interpreted world
politics in terms of both Western liberalism and communism - a
powerful combination of viewpoints that exerted a great and lasting
impact upon modern China.
Zhou became involved in China's politics in the early 1920s when
he returned to China. During the decade-long civil war between the
Chinese Communists (CCP) and the Nationalists (KMT), beginning in
Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, pp. 18-19.
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1927, he became one of the dominant personalities in political,
military, and especially foreign affairs in the CCP leadership.
From 1936 to 1946, Zhou assumed many of the burdens of the CCP's
external affairs. In fact, during this period, it was an important
part of Zhou's "diplomatic method" to persuade the foreigners, in
particular the Americans, to accept the CCP's analysis of Chinese
political, military, economic and social conditions. John Service,
a young U.S. diplomat in China at that time, was so impressed by
Zhou's analytical abilities that "he loosely compared Chinese
Communist approach to the rigorous techniques of Western social
science.Thus, persuading and winning over of "good people"
J

became one of the central tasks of Zhou's diplomacy.
In addition, he was particularly attentive to personal contact.
He had extensive contacts with foreign diplomats, journalists, and
U.S. military personnel who visited China during the World War II.
When George Marshall, the private representative of President
Trxaman, made efforts to mediate the conflict between the CCP and
the KMT in 1946, Zhou favorably impressed him. As historian George
Patterson reported. General Marshall spoke of Zhou with "friendship
and esteem" and thought him "a shrewd negotiator and a statesman of
international calibre."^*
Despite his notable activities in China's politics, Zhou never
confided to the public his thinking on world politics until 1949,

" Ibid.
George Patterson, Peking Vs. Delhi (New York: Praeger Press,
1967), p. 48.
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when he became the head of Communist China's foreign affairs.
During 1949-1950, Zhou presented a series of lectures on China's
diplomacy, world politics, and Chinese diplomatic strategy in the
bipolar worldThese presentations not only revealed his thinking
on world politics and diplomacy, but they also set the keynote for
Beijing's future foreign policy. His writings in 1949-1950 offered
insight into why Zhou tried to pursue the national interest through
diplomacy rather than a revolutionary means while China remained an
isolated power in the 1950s.
On September 9, 1949, before the foundation of the People's
Republic of China, Zhou presided over the draft of "The Common
Program."^® This program provided that, first of all, any foreign
government which sought to establish diplomatic relations with
Beijing must sever its formal contacts with the KMT regime in
Taiwan. Second, the new government in Beijing would join the
socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. Third, there would be no
concessions to the West for the sake of quick and easy diplomatic
recognition.'^'
"The Common Program" then established the basis for Beijing's
foreign policy and its diplomatic goals. It remained ambiguous.
See "New China's Diplomacy," "The Foreign Policy of PRC,"
and "International Situation and Diplomacy." in Selected Works of
Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 1-48.
The full name is "The Common Program of Chinese People's
Political Consultation." This document, adopted in 1949, defined
the basis policies of the PRC in the political, economic, foreign
affairs fields. Until 1954, "The Common Program" functioned as the
provisional institution of China.
" Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, pp. 5-6.
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however, on the specific approaches to the conduct of diplomacy in
line with accepted international law and norms. At that time, the
Chinese

leadership

was

divided

over

its

foreign

policy,

particularly among the party cadres and the non-party officials who
participated

in

Beijing's

government

headed

by

the

Chinese

Communist Party.
On November 8, 1949, Zhou as the premier of the new regime came
out to answer the questions on Beijing's foreign policy. He was
invited to present the first, exhaustive lecture on "New China's
Diplomacy" at the inauguration of China's Foreign Ministry. This
speech, along with the two more essays written in 1950, constituted
the core of Zhou's thinking on world politics and the function of
diplomacy.
From the beginning, Zhou interpreted international politics from
the perspective of the Leninist theory of class struggle. He
accepted that the world was divided into different camps because
nation-states were governed by ruling classes which were possessed
of political power based on their economic monopoly. Accordingly,
there existed two pplitical-ideological alignments in post-WWII
world politics. One was the socialist camp headed by the Soviet
Union; the other was the capitalist camp directed by the United
States.^® Within the Cold War environment, Zhou believed that it
was imperative for the infant regime in Beijing to join the Soviet
camp for the reasons of PRC's security and legitimacy.

"Xinzhongguo waijiao," (New China's Diplomacy) in Selected
Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 1-2.
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In terms of the nature of diplomacy, however, Zhou argued that
"diplomacy should not be limited to the two camps.He defined
"diplomacy" as the conduct of official relationships between the
governments of independent nations. He explained that politically,
China had joined the socialist camp. But the Chinese government did
not discriminate against any capitalist country that was willing to
develop diplomatic relations with the PRC on terms of equality and
mutual respect for territory sovereignty. Zhou deemed that nations
with different systems could coexist in a bipolar world.On the
basis of Lenin's theory of imperialism, he added that imperialism
(here meaning the United States) would have trouble launching a new
world

war

for

three

reasons.

First,

it

could

not

mobilize

sufficient manpower to start a new world war; next, its allies,
such as the NATO, would not accept the U.S. adventures; and third,
a powerful Soviet camp was an inexorable force to deter any war
attempt by imperialists."^^ Therefore, Zhou stated that China would
concentrate its resources on economic reconstruction and pursue its
security and legitimacy through peaceful coexistence. "Toward this
end," he argued, "diplomacy was the first and foremost task.""
At the end of his lecture, Zhou expanded on diplomacy. He stated
Ibid., pp. 2-3. For further details, see "Omen de waijiao
fangzheng he renwu," (Our Foreign Policy and its Tasks), p. 48.
Ibid., pp. 2-4.
For further information, see "Zhongsu diyuhou de guojixingshi he waijiaorenwu," (The International Situation and Diplomatic
Tasks after the Signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty), in Selected Works
of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 12.
" Ibid., see "New China's Diplomacy," p. 2.
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that "diplomacy embraces both unity and struggle. Strategically, we
side with the fraternal states of the socialist camp, but also
admit to tactical differences between those states. We are opposed
to the [Western] powers strategically, but tactical agreements with
them are allowed, too."^^ He regarded diplomacy as the continuation
of war by other means. In his words, "Military and foreign affairs
are two kinds of fights: the fight of swords and the one of words."
Zhou concluded that "diplomacy falls within the fight of words as
opposed to the fight of swords. To be successful, it must be backed
up by military power"^^ In addition, Zhou spoke on the importance
of 'diplomatic dialogue', stressing that "diplomacy implies patient
intellectual communications for mutual understanding among nations
because they have deeply-rooted divergences considering the races,
religions, languages, and social norms and ethics.In this
analysis of diplomacy, Zhou sensibly prized the conventional axioms
^ of modern diplomacy, "the means at the disposal of diplomacy are
three: persuasion, compromise, and the use of force.
From Zhou's perception of world politics and diplomacy, one can
see the profound legacy of the Western impact on China. He regarded
world politics as the extension of domestic conflicts, but he also
accepted western international law, diplomatic norms and rules as

" Ibid.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., p. 6.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations. (New York:
McGraw-Hill Publisher, 1986), p. 565.
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efficient means of resolving international crises. The salient
point is these two different Western ideologies (the liberal values
and Marxist views) were accepted by the Chinese as intellectual
sources of their analysis of world politics because they found the
western

theories helpful

in achieving China's own legitimate

interests. As Teng Ssuyu and John Fairbank observed, with the help
of the Western liberalism, the Chinese intellectuals had torn down
the traditional Chinese system; but now, in the process of the
nation-rebuilding, they turned to invoke the Soviet Union and its
communist ideology.Striving for an independent and strong China
had been a goal to which Zhou's whole generation aspired. They
learned the Western ideologies to serve their ends.
As the Premier of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai
personified the attempt to turn Western ideologies and diplomatic
norms into a Chinese approach to diplomacy which would accomplish
China's ends.

Teng &, Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 240.
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Chapter II.
The Search for Security and Legitimacy through Diplomacy

Upon assuming power on October 1, 1949, the first diplomatic task
of the Chinese communist regime in Beijing was "to acquire the
recognition of foreign governments and to enter the international
community."^®

At

that

time, Mao and Zhou regarded diplomatic

recognition from foreign governments as a preliminary step toward
the establishment of diplomatic relations. In an ideologically
divided world, recognition might lead to peaceful co-existence with
states of different social systems. With this belief in mind, Mao
expressed his anxiety on the eve of the founding of the PRC. Shi
Zhe, an intimate aide of Mao, later recalled that "Chairman Mao
implied in 1949 if no foreign government recognizes the new regime
of China in a few days, that would matter severely."^®
On October 1, 1949, Mao, as the first President, announced the
birth of the PRC to the foreign governments of the world. In his
statement, Mao appealed to the rest of the world, saying that the
new regime in Beijing "is the sole legal government representing
the entire [Chinese] nation. It is willing to establish diplomatic
relations with the government of any country which is willing to
abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual
respect for territory sovereignty."®® On the same day, Zhou, in a

Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 7.
She Zhi, "Accompanying Chairman Mao to visit to Moscow", in
The Winds and Clouds of New China's Diplomacy, ed., vol. 2. p. 34.
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 7.
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letter of transmittal to foreign governments, stressed that the new
government of the PRC needed both diplomatic ties with other states
and admission to the United Nations.
At that time, the responses from the foreign governments to
Beijing's appeal varied in accordance with their alignments in the
Cold War and their attitudes toward the former KMT regime in exile
on Taiwan. Zhou insisted that China should be flexible in order to
obtain the basic essentials of statehood: diplomatic recognition,
bilateral trade, and membership in the international organization.
Considering the new regime of the PRC within the bipolar Cold
War, Zhou stated that the People's Republic of China aligned itself
with the Soviet camp in order to achieve its security and economic
needs.Hence, he accompanied Mao on a visit to Moscow in 1950 to
persuade Stalin to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and
Friendship.®^ The treaty was specifically directed against "the
revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on
the part of Japan or any other state that collaborates in any way
with Japan in acts of aggression."®^ Regarding its power in 1950,
Beijing's request for an alliance with Moscow revealed the concerns
of Chinese leaders for security, their ideological affinity with
the USSR, and. both Mao and Zhou's perception of world politics.
With regard to the war-torn Chinese econoiiy and its uncertain
" Ibid.
According to Shi Zhe, Mao was accorded a grand reception in
the Kremlin when he arrived in Moscow, see The Winds and Clouds of
New China's Diplomacv. ed., Qian Qichen, vol. 2., pp. 1-13.
Han Nianlong, ed., Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 25.
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status in the world, Beijing stood to benefit considerably from its
alliance with Moscow. As Harold Hinton wrote, "The CPR regarded the
Sino-Soviet alliance as its main shield and potentially as its main
sword as well, against the imperialist camp."®^ Following Moscow's
lead, the Soviet camp from East Germany to North Korea extended
recognition and aid to Beijing. On October 23 1951, Zhou viewed the
friendship treaty of the Sino-Soviet as a shield behind which, as
he admitted, "China was not isolated in the world affairs and would
pursue its domestic reconstruction."®^
Gaining diplomatic recognition from the Soviet Union and its
allies represented only one aspect of Zhou's diplomacy. He also
informed the Beijing Foreign Service that the PRC's foreign policy
had to follow three basic guidelines. First, China needed to join
in solidarity with nations of the socialist camp. Second, it should
empathize with and win over the non-aligned states of Asia and the
Middle East. Last, but not least, it would seek an understanding
with the people of "imperialist" countries, trying to prevent the
outbreak of war by practicing peaceful co-existence with the people
of the [Western] countries.®®
On March 20 1950, when he addressed a group of high-ranking
diplomatic officials on foreign policy, Zhou once again stated the
significance of an active and flexible diplomacy. He reiterated
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 122.
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 27.
66 iiipj^Q International Situation and Diplomatic Tasks after the
Signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty," in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai
on Diplomacy, pp. 12-14.
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that diplomacy must not be restricted to the two camps, and that
China should increase contacts with each foreign government byvirtue of diplomatic recognition, economic trade and its rightful
seat in the United Nations." He confirmed the new government in
Beijing was willing to co-operate with all countries and welcomed
foreign aid on the basis of diplomatic equality and economic
reciprocity. Because of Zhou's realistic views and flexible effort.
The PRC established normal diplomatic relationship with nearly two
dozen states in the first year after its birth.®®
During this period of tiomultuous change in China's politics,
Beijing's relations with Washington were complicated. The Chinese
Communist victory and, consequently, the establishment of the PRC
in 1949 created such a chasm between the two powers that neither
government was able to bridge the ideological and political gulf.
On one hand, the CCP political elite supposed that Washington would
initially propose a new, equal relationship with the new government
in Beijing, since the United States had "wrongly" supported a
"corrupted" regime during China's civil war. On the other hand, the
majority of American politicians were not ready to acknowledge CCP
power in Beijing. As historian W.W. Stueck observed, "the Cold War
had so come to dominate American's mentality that common bargaining
was unthinkable with a communist regime that repudiated widely
accepted

standards

of

international

conduct

and

showed

open

" Ibid., p. 11.
These states included India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Holland, Norway and all members of
the Soviet camp.
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allegiance to Moscow."®®
In September 1949, Washington decided to oppose seating Beijing
in the United Nations, moved its embassy from Nanking to Taipei in
May, and in April even rebuffed Huang Hua, an aide to Zhou, who
sought to explore the opening of "personal" dialogues between Mao
and Zhou and American officials in the White House.''" Accordingly,
China came to regard the United States as an ideological adversary
and potentially a strategic threat as well. Washington's intention
was perceived ostensibly as blocking Beijing's efforts to achieve
diplomatic recognition and to enter into the U.N., which were the
primary concerns of the new leaders of the PRC. As historian Steven
Goldstein later wrote, "[CCP] statements about the United States
were almost uniformly hostile. The animosity they reflected was
both strong and clear. Any suggestions of possible ties with the
United States were vague in 1949."'^
From 1949 to June 1950, Beijing's open hostility toward the
United States included the detention of its diplomats on espionage
charges and the mistreatment of western missionaries remaining in
China. Still, as Goldstein discussed, "Beijing's policy and its
conduct were constrained in what it could do by the weight of past
W.W. Stueck, Jr.. The Road to Confrontation; American Policy
toward China and Korea. 1947-1950. {Chapel Hill, NC: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 2.
The author of this paper interviewed Mr. Huang Hua on this
matter in the Clarement Graduate School, California, November 1990.
Steven M. Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy Toward the
United States: Opportunities and Constraints 1944-50" in Uncertain
Years: Chinese-American Relations. 1947-50, ed., Dorothy Borg &
Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Coliimbia University Press, 1980), p. 8.
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policies and perceptions, the pressures of domestic public opinion
and international commitments."'^ All of these moves and countermoves made rapprochement between Beijing and Washington unlikely.
Despite its militant rhetoric, however, the CCP leadership was
ambivalent about policy toward America. According to Harry Harding,
a political scientist, "Mao and Zhou wished to maintain relations
with the United States and other Western countries, both to acquire
a wider range of commercial ties and to maintain a diplomatic
counterweight against the Soviet Union.

Before the Korean War

broke out in June 1950, Zhou proposed that Beijing and Washington
sit down and talk with each other in order to solve outstanding
issues between the two countries. At that time, his writings had
reiterated the theme that the United States needed to withhold its
recognition of the KMT regime on Taiwan and to accept admission of
the PRC to the U.N..'*
Ideologically, Zhou regarded U.S. power as superficial due to
its inevitable internal economic and social crises. On the basis of
his assumption, he did not consider the U.S. an imminent threat to
China, though an ideological adversary. On the contrary, Zhou had
proposed to explore a diplomatic contact between the two powers in

Ibid., p. 23.
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship. (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 26.
Liu Sha, "Zhou Enlai yu huifu oguo zai lianheguo hefaxiwei
de douzheng" (Zhou Enlai and China's Struggle for the Restoration
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Thought and Practice, p. 271.
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order to "influence American people and find the common ground."'^
The Korean War broke out on June 26 1950 and smashed any hope
that the passage of time would allow the two countries to find
these common grounds. According to Harding's recent studies, the
Korean conflict did not result from decisions made in either
Beijing or Washington. But strategic needs and ideological empathy
with an ally inevitably committed the two powers to intervene in
the Korean War.''® On the second day. President Truman ordered the
Seventh

fleet

to

patrol

the

Taiwan

strait,

justified

this

deployment as a military necessity imposed by the Korean conflict,
and implied no intention as to the ultimate disposition of Taiwan.
Beijing clearly saw it as confirming a long-standing U.S. policy of
intervening China's civil war on the side of the KMT. Consequently,
on June 28, Zhou delivered a strongly-worded statement, condemning
Truman's order as "an open, armed invasion of Chinese territory in
total violation of the U.N. Charter."'" As the diplomat-historian
George Kennan wrote in 1950, "American policy toward the rival
Chinese regime is one sure to strengthen Beijing-Moscow solidarity
rather than weaken it."''®
On September 15, 1950, under the command of General MacArthur,
U.S. amphibious landing at Inchon was surprisingly successful and
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 14.
Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 26.
''' "The Statement on U.S. Armed Invasion of Chinese TerritoryTaiwan" in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 18-19.
Kennan to Acheson, August 21, 1950, Foreign Relations of the
United States. VII, p. 624.
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thenceforth U.N. troops drove straight north. Given the rapidly
changing situation in Korea, on Septeinber 30, Zhou publicly warned:
that "the Chinese people... will not supinely tolerate seeing their
neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."''® The next
day (October 1), the South Korean anty crossed the thirty-eighth
parallel as General MacArthur delivered an ultimatum to Pyongyang
"forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such
military supervision as I may direct."®® This move alarmed Beijing's
leaders who regarded it as unacceptable.
On October 3, Zhou formally siammoned K.M. Panikkar, the Indian
ambassador to Beijing, to a dramatic midnight interview. In their
talk, Zhou drily repeated the points of his early statements that
Beijing would never sit idly watching North Korea being crushed by
U.N. forces which were actually commanded by U.S. generals. He
stated that China wished to solve the Korean crisis at the United
Nations but was ready to intervene in the Korean War.®^ During
their talk, Zhou also hinted of a possible compromise whereby China
would intervene only if American forces, as distinguished from
South Korean troops, crossed the 38th parallel.
Ambassador Pannikar immediately sent a report of his meetings

"Zhonghuarenmingongheguo de waijiaozhengce," (The People's
Republic of China's Foreign Policy," in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 24.
Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu. (Stanford University
Press, 1960), p. 93.
81 "Meijun ruyuguo sanbaxian, omen yaoguan," (If the U.S.
Forces Crossed the 38th Parallel, We will Intervene), in Selected
Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 25-27.
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with Zhou to New Delhi, whence it was relayed to London and then on
to Washington. Meanwhile, Zhou's warning was passed on through the
Chinese Foreign Service to the British minister. Sir John Hutchin
son, in Beijing.®^
Washington ignored Zhou's eleventh-hour diplomacy. Historian
Richard Whelan later wrote: one official of U.S. State Department
awakened Secretary of State Dean Acheson shortly after 5:30 a.m. on
October 3 and gave him the message from New Delhi. But Acheson just
dismissed the warning as "a sheer bluff".®^ At that time, Acheson
believed that "it would be a madness for the Chinese to enter the
Korean War when their major concerns were with Soviet domination
along their northern borders."®^ Since the Korean War started in
June, the U.S. image of Beijing's possible response had been based
on the twin assumptions: the legitimate interests of Beijing's
regime were in no way threatened by the U.S. action in Korea, and
that the Chinese had given primacy to their domestic n e e d s . I n
fact, it was easy for U.S. State Department to dismiss Pannikar's
messages; he was regarded in Washington as highly sympathetic to
the Chinese communists. At this crucial moment, historian Burton
Kaufman has argued, the difficulties of communication on both sides
and false calculations on the part of the White House complicated
Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, p. 47.
Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War. 1950-53.
(Boston, Mass: Little, Brown Company, 1990), p. 227.
Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer
sity Press, 1985), p. 81.
Ibid., p. 82.
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the problems of information and whence resulted in a distorted and
unrealistic image of Chinese intention towards U.S. action in
Korea.
But, why did Zhou not publicly issue a formal ultimatum to the
U.N. forces in the Korea? The answer is probably that Mao and Zhou
would have reasoned that a private warning would enable the U.S.
forces to halt at the 38th parallel without losing face.. Given
their military victory, "American and the U.N. forces could then
claim that they had decided on the basis of their own sense of
justice and superior morality that now that the original goal of
repulsing the North Korean invasion was achieved, the killing
should be stopped and peace restored at once."®'' If people accept
that Zhou wrongly chose ambassador K.M. Panikkar as a messenger, it
was because, at that time, India, both a neutral and Asian state,
stood as a likely link between the East and West.®® In addition,
Beijing showed goodwill toward New Delhi because India's silence in
the wake of Chinese "invasion of Tibet" justified Beijing's action
in that disputed area. Therefore, Zhou believed India politically
preferable to more traditional channels such as Danish, Swedish, or
Swiss representatives.
In October 1950, the Chinese regular arnY engaged U.S. forces in
Korea. On October 25, Zhou addressed the Chinese People's Political
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Consultative Conference (CPPCC) saying, "China and North Korea are
close neighbors.... If we do not resist U.S. armies in Korea, we
might 'encourage' its further adventures. Conversely, if we hit it
hard, U.S. troops will be bogged down in Korea."®® In later talks
to his aides, Zhou explained the reasons for Chinese intervention
in Korea saying, "it is necessary to patch an umbrella before it
rains {wei yu chou mu).As a new power so poor in comparison to
the United States, China dared to challenge the U.S. troops in
Korea only because, as Allen Whiting observed, China was motivated
overwhelmingly by concern for its own security and the legitimate
interests,®^ At the crucial moment during the Korean conflict, Zhou
played an equally decisive role as Mao did in the policy-making. He
assisted Mao in making the decision to send the Chinese troops to
enter Korea and, subsequently, directed the actions and measures of
Chinese delegation throughout the Korean truce negotiations.
During the Korean conflict, the two sides tested each other at
the negotiating table as well as on the battleground. By April
1951, the military situation on the Korean peninsula stabilized
basically along the lines that had existed before June 26 1950. On
July 10, the two sides, while continuing their fighting in Korea,
agreed to hold truce talks on the discussion of the following
®® Tian Jin,and Zhu Qing, "Luetan Zhouzongli dui chaoxian tingzhantanpan de lingdaosixiang" (On Premier Zhou's Strategy on the
Korean Truce Talks), in Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought
and Practice, ed., p. 181,
Ibid. Here, Zhou justified China's action in Korea because
U.N. forces approached to the borders.
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 151-153.
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issues: military demarcation, arrangement and supervision of the
cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, and
repatriation of POWs from the two parties.
Both sides readily reached agreements on the first two of the
four issues. Even the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea
was to be discussed at a later high-level political conference
which was assumed to be held in October 1953. However, the issue of
the repatriation of prisoners of war delayed the process of the
cease-fire talks for two years. China and North Korea reiterated
that, according to article 118 of the Geneva (POW) Convention of
1949, POWs should be "released and repatriated without delay after
the cessation of active hostilities," and "failing such a provision
in the armistice, each Detaining Power must establish and execute
without delay a unilateral plan of repatriation."®^ In contrast, the
United States and its allies insisted on the voluntary repatriation
of POWs, with respect for the individual right of each prisoner of
war.
At that time, the Soviet leaders, the CCP leaders, and the North
Korean leaders had different attitudes toward the POW issue. Joseph
Stalin made it clear at his meeting with Zhou on August 21, 1952
that "it is right to press the United States to change its stand...
[because] it is illegal for the Americans to refuse to repatriate
POWs."®^ On September 1, Stalin again pointed out that "there is no
United Nations Treaty Series, 75:224 (1950).
Shuguang Zhang, "In the Shadow of Mao: Zhou Enlai and New
China's Diplomacy," in The Diplomats: 1939-1979. ed., Gordon Craig
and Alexander George, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
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need to accept the American proposal on the POW issue, because [it]
concerns our principles. We may detain either less than or the same
nxamber of POWs held by the enemy.
Among the CCP leaders, the differences on the POW issue became
increasingly obvious. On February 23, 1953, Mao addressed the CPPCC
and referred to the Chinese POWs captured in the Korean War. Zhou
Qingwen, one of the highest-ranking officials who later defected to
the West in 1959, recalled that Mao declared vehemently, raising
his right hand high in the air, "Every Chinese officers and
soldiers captured in the Korean War must be repatriated."®^ Mao
explained: "We will agree upon a cease-fire only when the political
and military situations are favorable to us. To accept the enemy's
proposal under pressure means to sign a peace treaty under coercion
(jie chengxia zhi meng) which is detrimental to us."®®
But Zhou thought it necessary to achieve a cease-fire in Korea
as long as the status quo was restored and maintained. Accordingly,
he proposed a more flexible position on the POW issue. According to
Xia Yan, who was one of Zhou's intimate friend, Zhou told Li Kenong
and Qiao Guanhua, two advisors to Chinese negotiators during the
Panmunjon truce talks, that "while we honor our commitments to our
ally, we should also know when and where to stop fighting our enemy
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He added, "Resisting America and aiding [North]

Korea is to defend Chinese security and to honor our commitments to
our ally. However when eneity asks for peace and enters truce talks,
we need to make the end of warfare work to our advantage."®®
The talks on POW issue remained deadlocked until March 1953 when
Zhou was finally able to break the log jam at Panmumjom. Stalin's
death apparently removed a major roadblock on the POW issue and Mao
began to turn his focus from the Korean War to the war-torn economy
in China. After his trip to Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral, Zhou
held out a compromise designed to renew the deadlocked armistice
negotiations. In his statement of March 30, he proposed that "in
accordance with each individual's will and right, the prisoners of
war who insisted on returning to the original side must be repa
triated immediately; and whereby the POWs who failed to declare
themselves in favor of repatriation would be handed over to the
supervisory commission of the neutral countries for the final
determination of their status and definite whereabouts."®®
In the context of the post-Stalin uncertainty in Moscow and, by
then, Zhou's insistence on a compromising approach to the issue of
POWs, the Korean armistice agreement was finally signed by both
sides on July 27, 1953. Thence Zhou Enlai could shift his attention
from the Korean War to the broader diplomatic activities.
Reviewing their behavior in foreign affairs from 1949 to 1953,
Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought and Practice,p.22.
®® Ibid., p. 22.
®® Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 56.
38

the new governing elite of China pursued two goals of security and
legitimacy through diplomacy backed by power. They perceived and
evaluated the events - diplomatic recognition and the Korean War in terms of international law, actually invoked international law,
modified the accepted interpretations, and practiced what law
preaches.They were also well aware that "diplomacy without
force produces a farce, while force without diplomacy can yield a
fiasco. Without both diplomacy and power, negotiation with its
adversaries was unlikely or impossible.

Yet, the Korean truce

agreement did not end the stalemate between China and the United
States; on the contrary, their stalemate expanded to three fronts:
the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan strait, and Indochina. Moreover,
Washington hardened its efforts to block Beijing's admission to the
U.N.. The Chinese leaders felt the huge pressure of diplomatic
isolation and military encirclement imposed by the United States.
Zhou believed it necessary to circumvent this U.S. containment
policy of China. The 1954 Geneva Conference offered him such an
opportunity. Therefore, he made his diplomatic debut on a much
broader international platform

Cohen, Jerome, ed., China's Practice of International Law.
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39

Chapter III
Going to Geneva

By 1954, China had emerged as a new force to be reckoned with in
Asia. Its young air force was equipped with the first-line MIG jets
second to none in Asia except that of the United States,^°^ As
Doak Barnett, a specialist on China's foreign policy has put it,
" [China] loomed as the colossus of the East in the eyes of many
Asians..,. Beijing's demonstrated power now convinced many Asians
that

neutralism

and

accommodation

with

Communist

China

were

necessary and desirable
In the eyes of the Americans, however, the regime in Beijing was
not only lawless, it was also a war monster. As early as 1951, the
United States began to design its overall strategy aimed at contain
-ing China through deploying its forces to the Asian-Pacific areas.
The policy-planners in Washington regarded Beijing's support for
the Vietminh Communists, its involvement in the Korean War, and its
ties with the communist rebels in Southeast Asia as convincing
evidence, in the words of Harry Harding, that "Beijing's ultimate
goal was the communist seizure of power across Asia."^°^
On March 24 1953, Secretary of State Dulles warned that "our
Eastern friends, from Japan, Korea and Formosa to Indonesia and
Malaya, faced a single hostile front - Communist China. The Korean
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armistice, even if it would lead to a political settlement in
Korea, would not have ended United States concern in the Western
Pacific area."^°^ Months later. President Eisenhower spoke to the
Americans saying, "we won an armistice on a single battleground,
not a peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease
our quest.

As strategic deployments continued between 1953 and

1954, the United States succeeded in concluding a mutual defense
treaty with Taiwan and forged military alliances with South Korea
and Japan. The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi
zation (SEATO) in 1954 was ostensibly to contain PRC's influence
and isolate Beijing in Asia. As historian John L. Gaddis stated:
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles emphasized the deterrent
power of alliances. Their aspiration was to encircle China with a
ring of states aligned with the United States either by the
collective security treaty - SEATO or bilateral pacts with South
Korea and Taiwan... [with] the hope that a U.S. security "umbrella"
over them would discourage Chinese attacks.^"
Under these circumstances, Beijing's strategy encompassed two
aspects. First, China urgently needed to develop an ability to
deter American attack or threat of attack. In an effort to achieve
that end, Zhou tried to manipulate the Sino-Soviet alliance to the
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Chinese advantage. From 1950 on, Mao and Zhou looked to the Soviet
Union for more advanced weaponry, including new missiles. Moreover,
Zhou sensibly turned to Moscow for helping create an "environment"
where China-U.S. contact would be made possible. According to Shi
Zhe, "Since 1953, Zhou asked Molotov to help extricate China from
the isolation imposed upon it by the United States. Molotov in turn
promised that the Soviet Union was willing to make every effort to
help China return to the world theater."^®® In the 1950s, China
needed an influential ally, like the Soviet Union, to endorse its
claims to the legitimate interests in the world affairs.
Secondly, Zhou adopted a conciliatory approach toward the West
and the other Asian and Middle Eastern nations in order to expand
diplomatic and economic ties. On June 5 1953, he asserted: "The
major contradiction in today's world is that of peace and war. We
advocated the resolution of all international disputes through
peaceful negotiations. We dare to practice peaceful coexistence and
peaceful competition with different systems in the world at large;
it is now the focus of our foreign policy."^"® In October, Zhou
declared that an. armistice of the Korean War type would be possible
in Indochina. Afterward, the Chinese newspapers began to reiterate
the theme that "there is no international dispute that can not be
settled through peaceful talks.

On December 31, Zhou referred

Shi Zhe, "Random Recollection," p. 34.
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42

to the five principles of peaceful coexistence during meetings with
the Indian delegation. He told his guests, "So long as the five
principles are adhered to, any outstanding issue between states can
be discussed on the table.

Obviously, since the end of the

Korean War, Zhou was eager to show the world that the watchword of
Beijing's diplomacy was "peaceful coexistence" as mandatory to
achieve its goal of security and legitimacy.
In an effort to realize Beijing's diplomatic goals, Zhou defined
a series of specific measures after consulating with the Politburo
of the CCP. First, he managed to maintain the status quo in Korea
if not to solve all the outstanding issues through the political
conference, which was scheduled to convene in October 1953. Next,
Zhou insisted on the restoration of peace and stability in Indo
china through diplomacy instead of war. Last, he directed the
communist forces of China to use military pressure against the
offshore islands held by KMT troops. In December 1953, Chinese
communist forces twice launched military attacks on the KMT-held
islands. Zhou's goals were obviously

to disrupt

the growing

strategic links between the United States and Taiwan and to force
diplomatic dialogue between Beijing and Washington.
By combining power and diplomacy, Zhou's strategy eventually led
to an expected result. In 1954, the world at large felt uneasy
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about the confrontation between the wealthiest power in the world
and the most populous nation on the earth. Some of the statesmen of
the West and East proposed to convene an international conference,
including the PRC and the USA, to solve the crises in the Far East.
As Kenneth Young later wrote, the pressures and dangers felt all
over the world in the mid-1950s, born of the uneasy Korean truce,
the critical Indochina war, and the persisting clashes in the
Taiwan area were the prime factors in bringing the Chinese and
American to the negotiation table at Geneva."^
On January 25 1954, as had previously been arranged, the Foreign
Ministers of the "Big Four" (the United States, the Soviet Union,
Britain, and France) met in Berlin to discuss the issues of peace
and security of the world and the German question. At that time,
the U.S.-China stalemate in Asia and in particular the Indochina
war became the focus of the East-West conflict. Considering these
dangers, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, formally
proposed to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain,
and France that a five-power conference including the People's
Republic of China be. held "to seek measures for reducing tension in
international relations.
Not surprisingly. Secretary Dulles rejected Molotov's proposal
and insisted on the United States would not agree to discuss the
general issue of world peace at a five-power conference with the

Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 23.
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presence of the Chinese communist aggressors. He lashed out at
Beijing's foreign policy, arguing that "nothing that has happened
up to date enables us to say that [Communist] China is willing to
collaborate in effort to bring about a solution on an acceptable
basis of Korean and Indochina issues.

Yet, Molotov's proposal

was accepted by the British and French Foreign Ministers, who had
considered that "a settlement in Asia occupied a higher place in
their [strategic] interests."^"
At the Berlin conference of 1954, the British Foreign Secretary,
Anthony Eden, capitalized on Molotov's proposal as a chance to seek
to relax the tensions in Asia, especially the increasingly critical
and dangerous Indochina war. In a letter to Winston Churchill from
Berlin, Eden wrote, "[Americans] are at present strongly opposed to
the idea of a five-power conference with China, mainly because they
are not prepared to admit the right of Communist China to be one of
the great powers in dealing with world problems,... their objection
might be less if the conference were specifically limited to the
Far East." Eden continued, "Mr. Dulles admits that non-recognition
is no obstacle to meeting the Chinese and, in fact, the Americans
are meeting them in Panmunjom.

Therefore, Eden urged the Prime

Minister and the Cabinet to favorably reflect upon the possibility
of a five-power conference on the Far Eastern problems, if the
Americans could be brought to consider it.
Han Nianlong, Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 61.
Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, p. 71.
Eden, Full Circle, p. 98.
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At the beginning of 1954, it was clear that French efforts to
crush the Vietminh insurrection were destined to early failure,
Quai d'Orsay had disclosed to the British and the U.S. embassies in
Paris

that

no

French

government

could

refuse

a

five-power

conference which would offer an honorable means of bringing the war
in Indochina to an end.^" Georges Bidault, the Foreign Minister,
though urgent for truce negotiations, was tempted by his dream of
making China cease helping the Vietminh as the price of her own
participation in the Geneva Conference.Then, he accepted the
view that it would be inexpedient to resist a proposal for a fivepower conference confined to Far Eastern issues beginning with
Korea. In view of great U.S. role in the world affairs, Bidault
explained to Dulles with the persuasive argument: "China, as the
real power behind the Vietminh, could no longer be ignored.
Accordingly, Dulles conceded to Bidault the principle of adding
Indochina on the agenda of a five-power conference at Geneva.
Under the pressure of U.S. allies and the critical situation in
Indochina, Dulles modified his early rejection of the proposal by
Molotov. In a private talk with Bidault and Eden on January 26, he
told them that while he remained firmly opposed to a five-power
conference, including Communist China, with a worldwide agenda, he
had no objection to discussing appropriate issues with China.
Afterward, Dulles indicated to the press that negotiations with
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, p. 43.
Ibid.
Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, p. 72.
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Conununist China were unavoidable because of French insistence.As
a response to the modified stand of Dulles, Molotov, an veteran
Soviet diplomat, also compromised by relating the Geneva conference
only to the issues of East Asia.^^^
After three weeks hard bargaining, the four Ministers came to an
agreement first on admitting the PRC to the Geneva Conference. On
February 18, the Berlin four-power conference issued a communique
foormally stating "that the problems of restoring peace in Indochina
will also be discussed at the forthcoming Geneva Conference on the
Korean question, to which representatives of the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's
Republic and other interested states will be invited.
The Geneva Conference became a reality; it was to assemble on
April 26. Beijing was invited to Geneva as a major power. But this
historical event should be considered from two perspectives. First
of all, China emerged as a new power in Asia, and had considerable
influence in both Korea and Indochina historically and geographi
cally. In 1954, although Dulles refused to admit the right of China
to be one of the major powers in dealing with a worldwide agenda,
America's allies, i.e. Britain and France, were ready to accept
China's status in dealing with Asian questions. Thus, the British
and the French persuaded Dulles to modify his earlier stand against
inviting China to be invited to Geneva. Also important, perhaps
Ibid., p. 73.
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 35.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 43.
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more important, was that from the start Beijing received Molotov's
firm support for a five-power conference including China as a full
member. At that time, Molotov adhered to his tactics of insisting
on obtaining the convening power status and full parity for Beijing
with the Big Four in the Geneva Conference of 1954, As Kenneth
Young later put it, "Molotov had won a place for Beijing in the
world's top councils for the first time in the short life of the
Chinese People's Republic.
Because the Geneva Conference was

the first

international

conference at which the PRC was invited as a "Major power, " Mao and
Zhou attached great importance to this opportunity. In March 1954,
with Mao's approval, Zhou accepted the invitation and began to
supervise the drafting of the key document "Our Estimation of the
Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation."
This draft paper specified the strategies and ends that should be
achieved at the Geneva Conference. It pointed out that "the United
States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on
the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling
their views; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be
further exploited to our advantage.
Based on this line of reasoning, Zhou directed his aides that
"our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and
seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the
representatives from the neutral countries.... [so as] to achieve
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 26.
Han Nianlong, Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 65,
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at least a tentative agreement with them. We must try not to let
the

[Geneva]

conference

end

without

any

result.

He

also

stressed that everyone, no matter what his position, "must be wellinformed and observe the discipline of the delegation in any
way."
As for the goals of the two communist powers at Geneva in 1954,
Moscow and Beijing agreed on high-level principles, but each side
had a different emphasis. However, their different emphases were
not what as K.C. Chen's analysis showed in 1969. According to Chen,
"To Moscow, China's participation in the conference was necessary
for the settlement of international problems; whether or not China
was a major power, was secondary. To Beijing, [it] was necessary
because China's power deserved such participation; whether interna
tional issues could be settled, was not primary.

In fact, Chen

misjudged both Beijing's and Moscow's chief concerns at the Geneva
Conference. To Moscow, the need to assert the great power status of
its Chinese ally, was then more important than its own agenda.
To Beijing, the new governing elite felt proud to attend the Geneva
Conference as a newly-recognized force. Yet, that was not their
most pressing concern. As Qu Xing put it, Beijing hoped that the
Geneva Conference would enhance the international status of the
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PRC, but the security of China continued to be a primary focus. In
view of U.S. policy of aiding resistance to communism in Indochina
and building a broad collective security alliance in Southeast Asia
since the end of the Korean War, Zhou was primarily concerned that
foreign military bases would not be allowed in Indochina and that
military alliances of each Indochinese state with foreign power(s)
had to be proscribed. As he later told the Geneva Conference on May
12, Chinese efforts were to prevent the formation of a U.S.dominated alliance in Indochina and also the establishment of U.S.
bases there.
Zhou was anxious to achieve substantive results at Geneva. In
early April he made a special trip to Moscow to consult with the
Soviet leaders on the upcoming conference at Geneva. According to
Shi Zhe, an aide to Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low
expectations on the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued
differently, saying "That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can
jointly participate in the international conference, as the Geneva
Conference is itself an unexpected event and is one of our
[diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take
explanations on some issues so as to resolve some disputes
Since it was the first time that Beijing had taken part in such an
international conference, Zhou asked that "the Chinese and Soviet
delegates must keep close contact, so as to exchange opinions and

"Guanyu yinduzhina wenti de fayan, " (Address on Indochina
Issue), see Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 68-71,
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information, rectify different stands, and support each other's
actions.

The Soviet side accepted his request. As Khrushchev

wrote in his memoir, "we all consider Zhou a bright, flexible, and
up-to-date man, with whom we could talk sensibly.
During his stay in Moscow, Zhou continued to confer with Molotov
and his advisors on foreign policy in general, on American motives
and on the position that they might adopt at the Geneva Conference.
Still as Shi Zhe recalled, "Premier Zhou carefully listened to the
Soviets' views because at that time they had more reliable methods
to acquire information on US foreign policy and had more experience
in dealing with Americans.

To show his sincerity, Zhou asked

Molotov to teach the Chinese diplomats "how to act appropriately on
diplomatic occasions" before they went to Geneva.
Zhou returned to Beijing on April 12 and reported to Mao on his
conversations with the Soviet Union leaders in Moscow. With Mao's
approval, Zhou proceeded to make final preparations including
determining the composition and size of the Chinese delegation for
the Geneva Conference. He also agreed to send a huge delegation to
Geneva for the purposes of "expanding the Chinese diplomats' vision
and increasing their experience in international struggles; and
demonstrating New China's strength in foreign affairs.

In view

of the possible difficulties at the Geneva Conference, the Soviet
Ibid.
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Union, China, and the Vietminh decided to meet in Moscow to confer
with each other on the specific steps at the upcoming conference
before they went to Geneva. On April 20, the Chinese delegation
headed by Zhou left Beijing for Geneva via Moscow on a special
plane. In Moscow, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries
agreed to seek in every way to realize a cease-fire and define the
partition line acceptable to the two contending sides, to take
advantage of differences among the western powers, and to persuade
France to accept the peace terms through diplomatic means backed up
by military pressure.

After this final pre-conference meeting,

the Chinese delegation headed by Zhou and the Soviet delegation led
by Molotov arrived in Geneva in succession on April 24. Since it
was the first large delegation sent by Beijing after the new regime
was founded, it was all the more conspicuous. Zhou Enlai, along
with the other foreign dignifies, became the central figure in the
reports of the Western press.

Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 255.
52

Chapter IV
Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva

Geneva is a frequent site for international conferences, and the
conference of 1954 was benefitted by both the United Nations
Organization and Swiss hospitality. The Geneva Conference opened on
April 26 and was equally concerned with Korea and Indochina.
For two centuries, Europe had been the center of world diplomacy.
This was where the great powers conducted classical diplomacy,
dominated Europe, and later influenced the whole world. Since
China, an old, oriental empire, was forced to join the European
international system in the mid-19th century, its status had been
dictated by the European powers. At the 1919 Paris Conference in
particular, China's fate was at the mercy of the great powers. To
Zhou, a college student then, the most unacceptable fact was that
China had been aligned with the Allies during the WWI, yet it was
forced to concede territory to its wartime ally, Japan, at the end
of the war. Zhou's lingering resentment was expressed at times
during his talks with foreign visitors after becoming the Premier
of the PRC.^^® What did the Geneva Conference now mean to Zhou as
the Premier of the world's most populous nation? Did he come to
Geneva, as Time described, "by standing before the world as the
face and voice of a giant determined to shut the U.S. out of Asia,
... ambitious to build itself from poverty to power, whatever the
cost in blood or sweatThat judgment seems too extreme to be
Roots, Chou-An Informal Biography, p. 158.
Time, May 10, 1954, p. 29.
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credible. Rather, Zhou came to Geneva in 1954 to declare that:
"The international status and rights of the People's
Republic of China have been subjected to impermissible
discrimination. The peaceful development and security of
China are being constantly threatened.... It is clear
that this situation should not prevail any longer. Our
conference should mark the beginning of the change in
this situation.""®
At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Zhou aimed to pursue what the
PRC saw as its legitimate interests; in particular, its security
and status.
The Geneva Conference was divided into two phases. One was the
Korean phase of the conference from April 26 to June 15; the other
was the Indochina phase from May 8 to July 21. The Korean phase
officially convened on April 26 and included delegations from the
Big Four, the PRC, North and South Korea, and twelve other states
that had fought in Korea under the aegis of the United Nations.^^^
By that time, the Korean issue, which had ended at Pamumjon,
characterized the diplomacy of stalemate of the Cold War in Asia.
According to Article IV and Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice
Agreement

of

1953,

both

belligerent

sides

agreed

to hold

a

political conference on October 26 1953 to "settle through negoti
ations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Korea,

the

permeated

peaceful

the

unification

negotiations

at

of

Korea.

Panmunjom

when

But
the

tensions
political
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conference began. There was no exchange of greetings and amenities
at any meeting. By December 12, nearly fifty meetings had been held
with no agreement being reached. Since then, neither side ever
resumed -or

settled

arrangements

for

a

subsequent

political

conference on Korea.
Moving to Geneva, the Korean issue entered an impasse soon after
both sides began to discuss the role of the United Nations and the
procedures in the political settlement of the conflict. The U.S.
and the South Korean delegates, with the support of the Western
delegates, were determined to see that the elections were observed
and controlled by the United Nations, but the delegates from North
Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and China, refused to accept this
proposal. The North Korean rhetoric reflected its bitterness toward
the U.N. which had condemned the North Korea as the aggressor in
the Korean War. Nam II, the Foreign Minister of the North Korea,
insisted that a national election in Korea should be conducted by
an all-Korean electoral commission, and that this commission be
composed of equal numbers of members from North and South Korea in
the important task of drafting an election law and implementing
election.

However,

during

the

Korean

phase

of

the

Geneva

Conference, various East-West proposals for a peaceful settlement
in Korea failed to bring about the merger of the Communist and noncommunist parts of a divided Korea.
Neither the positions of North and South Korea nor their allies'
agendas changed appreciably throughout May. By then, Eden, Bidault,
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 161.
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and Paul Spaak, Belgium's Foreign Minister, underlined the need for
U.N. supervision of an all-Korean election, which would have to
take into account the distribution of population in both North and
South Korea.Zhou argued that the U.N. had deprived itself of
the right

to supervise elections by virtue of its

"illegal"

intervention in the Korean War. He insisted that the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from Korea was the precondition for the Korean
people freely expressing their will in elections without external
interference. Meanwhile, Zhou added that "China would not oppose
international supervision of all-Korean general elections, provided
that international supervision was implemented by neutral states,
rather than the United Nations.""®
According to Handle, Zhou's bitterness toward the U.N. was
caused in part by the ends to which the United Nations lent itself
in the Korean War, and in part by Beijing's exclusion from U.N.
membership due to the American manipulation.^^® While maintaining
his opposition to U.N. supervision of all-Korean elections, Zhou
nevertheless suggested on May 12 that the participants ought not
let the conference remain at an impasse for any length of time over
the question of the U.N. role in the settlement. He argued that the
representatives should be aware that this conference was held for
the purpose of finding other ways to achieve a reasonable solution
of the Korean issue. But due to the uncompromising positions of the
Ibid.
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two sides on the role of the U.N. in all-Korean elections, the
discussion made no progress until May 14 when the formal Korean
session was recessed.
Plenary sessions on Korea were resTomed on May 22, and continued
on until June 15. Yet. there was no sign of an immediate reconcilation of views on either side. On June 15, the last discussion on
the Korean issue once again revealed the impossibility of reaching
an agreement on the authority of the U.N. and the principles of
free elections in the whole Korea. Even when there was hardly any
chance for an agreement on Korea, however, Zhou proposed that "the
participants agree to continue the efforts toward achieving a
peaceful

settlement

in

Korea

and

consider

negotiations at appropriate time and place.

resuming

possible

But Bedell Smith,

the U.S. chief deputy, stressed that "the Korean armistice agree
ment (paragraph 62), which had been approved by the U.N. on August
28, 1953 contained more formal and exact terms for the maintenance
of peace in Korea than did anyone's proposal.

In rebuttal, Zhou

argued that only the two contending sides were bound by the truce
agreement and that because this Conference had been convened on a
broader basis, it must, therefore, have its own agreement. He added
that "if this international conference failed to conclude a basic,
peaceful accord on the basis of consultation and reconciliation, it
would look bad in the eyes of the international community
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 54.
Randle, Geneva 1954, p. 163.
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 54.
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sir Anthony Eden, who chaired the last session, mediated bysuggesting that all the proposals made on that day, together with
the interpretive and critical statements, be made a part of the
conference record. There seemed to be no objections to his sugges
tion, and he brought the meeting to a close. Therefore, the Korea
phase of the Geneva conference, for all practical purposes, ended
in failure. A witness to the events later recalled that Zhou
revealed regret over the rejection of his proposal relating to
future

efforts

by

the participants of

the conference toward

unifying Korea. He complained that "there was no express provision
that recorded the desire of the United States as a big power to
achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea. That would have helped the
world be aware how it [the U.S.] tries to sabotage reaching a
peaceful resolution at the Geneva Conference.
It is certain that Zhou was dissatisfied with the result of the
Korean session of the Geneva Conference. In later talks with his
intimate aides, Zhou complained that both Dulles and Molotov were
too stubborn to make any compromise o n the Korean i s s u e . Y e t
Zhou also believed that the Korean armistice agreement, which had
been approved by the United Nations, had international legal
validity. In order to prevent the Geneva Conference from ending
without any result, Zhou pressed for continued discussion. He
stated that the PRC delegation had brought with it the spirit of
negotiation and reconciliation to participate for the first time in
Ibid., p. 54.
Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought & Practice, p. 22.
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this international conference. To that end, Zhou proposed to the
Conference "Taking those views that were shared in common as a
positive basis for moving forward in the talks and, meanwhile, in
the areas where disagreements existed, seeking a method for their
solution.

Once the stalemated Korean Conference came to an end

on June 15, Zhou now was able to concentrate on the Indochina
issue, which was his primary concern at Geneva.
While the Korean sessions were bogged down in debate, Eden, the
British Foreign Secretary and one of

the co-chairmen of the

conference, proposed to prepare for the Indochina discussions. In
early May, Eden first persuaded Bidault to agree to start discus
sing the Indochina issue on May 8, cleared this with Bedell Smith,
and then obtained Molotov's concurrence. As a result, the Indochina
session was scheduled to begin on May 8 in the Palais des Nations.
The participants included the delegations of the five major powers.
North and South Vietnam, and the Laotian and the Cambodian royal
governments.
At the time the Geneva Conference started, the fighting between
the French and the Vietminh had been going on for almost eight
years. By 1954, the military situation in Indochina was detrimental
to the French and its allies. Both the French and the Vietminh,
having different motives, agreed to stop fighting. To the French,
it was clear that their military efforts to crush the Vietminh had
become impossible. In addition, French public opinion pressed hard
on the French government to withdraw from Indochina on any terms
Zhang Shuguang, In the Shadow of Mao, p. 360.
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that could be negotiated with the Vietminh.^^^ But the French
government hoped to avoid entering into bilateral talks from a
position of weakness. The Vietminh, however, had confidence in the
strength of their hand: in the field or at the table. In 1954,
while his guerrilla forces intensified their fighting. Ho Chi Minh
offered through the Swedish diplomats to negotiate a truce with the
French.
Moving to Geneva, the nature and extent of the truce terms
proposed by the two sides were too divergent for an immediate
agreement to be reached. The news of the fall of Dien Bien Phu came
to Geneva just before the Indochina conference finally started on
May 8. No doubt this news, so shattering to the French delegation,
greatly encouraged the Vietminh deputies. The early differences
loomed larger than before on such issues as the cessation of
hostilities between the French and the Vietminh, the partition line
in Vietnam, the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia, and the member
-ship of the international supervisory commission. During the
conference, Pham Van Dong, the head of the Vietminh delegation,
became more inflexible on the terms. The Indochina talks from May
8 to June 15 moved very slowly, except that the military staffs of
the two sides met on May 19 to discuss the evacuation of the sick
and wounded prisoners from the fighting areas.
When the news of the Vietminh's victory at Dien Bien Phu reached
Geneya on May 7, Zhou was enthusiastic. He calculated that after
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 69.
Ibid., p. 87.
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such a defeat, the French would no longer hesitate to accept a
solution to the Indochina problem, and that the British would
certainly lend their support to the French. Without British and
French cooperation, the U.S. would have to accept a peaceful
settlement in Indochina.

At the same time Zhou was also aware

that the Vietminh had become uncompromising on the truce terms
since the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The Vietminh were concerned with
their growing military might and determined to drive the French out
of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh even called on his army and people to
fight for a "final victory" in Vietnam.
Now that the Vietminh had changed their promise to reach a truce
with the French as early as possible, Zhou had to deal with the
thorny problem of how to persuade his ally to accept a resolution
to which both sides could agree upon. Considering the possibility
of U.S. intervention in Indochina since May, he insisted on the
cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina and resiomption of an
immediate negotiations between the French the Vietminh."' In an
effort to accomplish his ends, he had to persuade the two parties,
especially the Vietminh, to make the necessary compromises on terms
during the Indochina session.
According to Chinese diplomatic journals, before leaving for
Geneva in April, Zhou agreed to help win a substantial victory on
the Vietnamese battleground before the Geneva Conference formally
Zhang Shuguang, In the Shadow of Mao, p. 360,
K.C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 309.
Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 256.
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began. Thus, he instructed Chinese Military Advisors Group (CMAG)
in Vietnam: "In order to achieve a victory in the diplomatic field,
you may need to consider if you could follow our experiences on the
eve of the Korean armistice to win several battles in Vietnam.
In May, Chinese artillery units and military advisors became
involved in the Dien Bien Phu campaign. At that time, Zhou had plan
to force the French to sit down and hold the truce talks with the
Vietminh. This way, the latter could bargain with their adversary
from a position of strength. Contemporary United States documents
describe the Vietminh victory as "a major political victory to
influence public opinion in France,.... designed to afford the
Communists a position of strength from which to negotiate at
Geneva."
The Dien Bien Phu campaign realized Zhou's end in terms of the
French position. After May 8, the French became more anxious to end
the conflict, provided the Vietminh withdrew its "invading forces"
from Laos and Cambodia simultaneously. Thus, the French offered a
mutually acceptable partition proposal. However, the Vietminh
became inflexible on two questions. First, they still refused to
admit that there were several Vietminh battalions in Laos and
Cambodia. They also insisted on the 16th parallel as the one and
only partition line. Under such circumstances, Zhou needed to
persuade his ally to make concessions on the partition line and on
Han Huizhi, ed., The Chinese Military Advisors Group in
Vietnam. (Beijing: Zhongguo jiushi Kexue Press, 1990), p. 99.
Foreign Relations of the United States (1952-54). (Wash
ington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982). p. 1134.
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the withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia.
On May 12, the third plenary session on Indochina was held. Zhou
told the conference that "the deputies assembled in Geneva should
discuss the ways of ending the conflict and of restoring peace in
Indochina as effectively as possible.""® Toward that end, he also
proposed, "it is essential on the basis of recognizing the national
rights of Indochina people to seek terms that will be considered
honorable, fair, and reasonable by the various sides concerned, and
to take effective measures so as to achieve at an early date an
armistice in Indochina and to restore peace in that area."^®^ Zhou
continued, "Beijing's position on the Indochina issue is that
peoples in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have the full right to
achieve peace, independence, unity, and democracy and to live in
peace in their respective Fatherlands."^®^
Zhou's address clearly indicated to both the Vietminh and the
French delegates that Beijing's position at Geneva were by no means
identical with that of the Vietminh's on every issue. Although
China gave full support to the Vietminh's anti-colonial struggle
for independence, it did not accept their claims to Cambodia and
Laos. If necessary, Beijing would further persuade the Vietminh to
agree to withdraw their military personnel from the two royal
states and to make compromises on the partition line. The Chinese
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 257.
Kenneth Young, (ed), The 1954 Geneva Conference Indochina
and Korea. (N.Y.; Greenwood Publisher, 1968), p. 126. This is a
collection of docixments on the Geneva Conference in 1954,
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 64,

concern came from superior French air power in Indochina and in
particular from a warning Dulles had issued in a speech to the
House of Representatives on May 20. "Continued Chinese help to the
Vietminh," Dulles said, "might call for retaliation... [and] atomic
weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage.""^
Since May 12, however, the discussion on Indochina brought no
progress due to the disagreement over the withdrawal of Vietminh
soldiers from Laos and Cambodia and the drawing of the partition
line. An equally controversial issue was how the implementation of
the eventual agreement(s) should be supervised. According to James
Cable, a British diplomat at Geneva, Eden agreed upon the principle
of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He insisted,
however, that the principle of partition should not apply to Laos
and Cambodia from which Vietminh forces had to withdraw immediately
and unconditionally. Eden's objective was to persuade the conferees
that "the problem of Laos and Cambodia differed fundamentally from
those of Vietnam and could be simply solved by the withdrawal of
Vietminh forces and their indigenous supporters.In addition, as
for the composition of the supervisory commission, Eden and his
allies accepted the idea that "no Communist could ever be neutral,
but some non-Communist could.

He accordingly proposed that five

Colombo powers - India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon - an
uneven number of neutral and Asian states, should provide the
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, pp. 55 & 79.
Ibid., p. 83.
Ibid., p. 85.

members of the supervisory commission.
At the sessions from May 12 to June 9, Zhou agreed to Eden's
proposal that the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia
should be respected and guaranteed by the international community.
But he challenged Eden's notion that a neutral state must be a nonCommunist state, and he insisted on the stipulation that the super
visory commission should operate on the principle of unanimity.^®®
On June 9, Zhou argued that "a neutral nation was one which had not
taken part in the fighting and the Korean precedent offered no
grounds for objecting to the idea that a commission composed of two
communists

and

two non-communists should

take only unanimous

decisions."^" He also dismissed the proposal of U.N. supervision,
saying that "[The] United Nations is not suitable to perform the
function of supervising the implementation of the armistice in Indo
-china.
o

Because neither side showed willingness to compromise on the he
withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Cambodia and Laos, the question
of troops dispositions and regroupment in Vietnam or in the three
states, and the composition and the principles of the international
commission for supervision and control, the repeated discussions on
Indochina limped along for weeks until June 16. During this period,
even private contacts offered no hope of escape from the impasse.
By June 10, there was greater cause for concern at Geneva. Jean
Randle, Geneva 1954, p. 271.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 93.
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 271.
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Chauvel, a French diplomat, complained that the Vietminh military
representatives were spinning out talks and playing for time, while
the Chinese and Russians were now unhelpful. Facing this dilemma,
Eden had to tell the Conference on June 10 that divergences were
wide and deep on the two sides. "We have no choice but to resolve
them or admit our failure."^®®
But Zhou was determined to move toward a substantive agreement
on the Indochina question. Considering the complex situation in
Indochina and the staggering negotiations at Geneva, what Zhou
needed was to devise a compromise program which no side would
reject and which no side would be absolutely satisfied. He was well
aware that the French and the Vietminh were the major players, but
Laos and Cambodia were by no means impotent pawns on the chess
board.

If the Vietminh continued to refuse to withdraw their

armed personnel from Laos and Cambodia, the latter would request a
western power, i.e. the United States, to provide various military
assistance for security reasons. At Geneva, the two small states
insisted on their legal right to accept the military assistance
from the West when they were menaced,In order to prevent this
from happening, Zhou proposed an early start to implement a simul
taneous cease-fire in Indochina, and he also promised Eden to
persuade the Vietminh to withdraw their forces from Cambodia and
Laos. Zhou's proposal aimed to expose no plausible reason for a
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 93.
Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy," p. 257.
Ibid., p. 266.
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foreign power to intervene in Indochina. His promise would ease
both Cambodian and Laotian concerns about their national security
and sovereignty.
On June 15, Zhou, Molotov, and Pham Van Dong met each other in
Geneva to discuss how to make progress on the Indochina issues. At
the meeting, Zhou stated that it was necessary for the Vietminh to
acknowledge their military personnel in Laos and Cambodia. In order
to make the Vietminh accept his proposal, Zhou suggested that at
the upcoming sessions, Pham Van Dong should admit the presence of
Vietminh soldiers in Laos and Cambodia, but also claim Vietminh
armed personnel were "volunteers" who entered Laos and Cambodia
during the early years of the war. The Vietminh would withdraw
those

armed

personnel

from the two states

according

to the

principle that all foreign troops would withdraw from Laos and
Cambodia.According to Qu Xing, Molotov on the spot endorsed this
proposal; and Zhou, Molotov, and Pham finally agreed that Zhou
would put forward his proposal at the session tomorrow.
The breakthrough came the next day. In the restricted session on
June 16 Zhou conceded that "the situation was not the same in all
three states of Indochina [and] the question of the withdrawal of
foreign troops was the one to be considered.He even envisaged
the right of Laos and Cambodia to import arms, provided that
foreign bases in the two royal states were forbidden.After some
''2 Ibid., p. 257.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 97.
Ibid.

polemics, Pham Van Dong acquiesced to Zhou's proposals, which were
subsequently endorsed by Molotov and welcomed by Chauvel, a French
diplomat; and Bedell Smith, a U.S. diplomat.
On the same day, Zhou requested a visit with Eden to expand on
his ideas. Both men agreed to use all available means to end the
tragic Indochina war, so long as a simultaneous execution of cease
fire took place and Vietminh forces withdrew out of Laos and
Cambodia. According to Eden, Zhou went so far as to say that the
Vietminh should respect the unity and independence of Laos and
Cambodia. He thought he could persuade the Vietminh to withdraw
from the two states, and that China would recognize their royal
governments, which might be members of the French Union, provided
that there were no American bases in the territory.

Eden said

that he welcomed Zhou's frankness and seriousness and his wish to
convey his remarks to Bidault, to which Zhou agreed. Eden later
wrote that "I received a strong impression that Zhou wanted a
settlement in Indochina and I accordingly urged Georges Bidault to
have a talk with [Zhou] and to discuss this new offer. I told
Bidault of my conviction that there might be a chance of a settle
ment as the outcome of this talk, and I begged him to go into it
with the utmost seriousness and determination."^''®
On June 17, Zhou met Bidault and they exchanged views on matters
of general principle relating to Indochina and the foreign policy
of their own governments. Because that was his last day as French
Eden, Full Circle, p. 145.
Ibid.
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Foreign Minister, they talked only briefly. But Bidault's talks
with Zhou convinced him that the Chinese were anxious to reach
agreement on Indochina; and even Jean Chauvel began to work at
drafting a proposal which would set in motion two further sets of
military staff talks on Cambodia and Laos. If that were accepted,
this would

result

in armistice talks

throughout

Indochina.^''''

During their meetings, Zhou did not make concessions to Bidault
detrimental to the interests of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, as
Hanoi would later complain in 1980.^'® In fact, because of the fall
of his government on June 17, Bidault was unable to accept any
proposal by Zhou on the key matters.
On June 19, Eden and Zhou met once again and talked in an easy
and relaxed fashion that was due to the trust they had in each
other. Eden urged Zhou not to expect greater concessions from the
new French government than they would have demanded of its prede
cessor. He also asked Zhou to restrain the Vietminh from launching
any military attacks in Indochina and, in particular, stressed the
importance of separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia.^'® Zhou said
that he agreed with Eden's view and that mutual concessions were
necessary. According to Andrew Stark, Eden's assistant to foreign
affairs, Eden admitted, "Zhou was a large animal.
Since his successful interviews with Eden and Bidault, Zhou
Ibid., p. 99.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 98.
Ibid. p. 100.
Ibid., p. 86.
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pushed his personal diplomacy further by flying to Berne on June
23, the Capital of Switzerland, to meet Pierre Mendes-France, the
new French Premier. The meeting was arranged at the French embassy
in Berne, and the Premiers "exchanged views covered the topics
vital to an Indochina settlement.

Because this was the first

summit meeting between China and France since 1949, it would
provide a new incentive for further negotiations at Geneva. As
Cable later wrote that the conversation lasted two hours and was
cordial, though Mendes-France admitted that Zhou was more relaxed
than he was: [I'hoime etait impressionant]. The two leaders gained
a better understanding of each other's foreign policy.
During the two-hour meeting, Zhou said what was essential was an
armistice in all three states of Indochina, followed by elections
in Vietnam for the reunification of that country under a single
government.Mendes-France agreed to all-Vietnamese elections, but
he argued these could not be held immediately. He also told Zhou
that the Vietminh were seeking a partition line unreasonably too
far to the South. Zhou then expressed a desire to see the two
Vietnamese delegations establish contact. Mendes-France merely
noted

that

formidable

political

and

psychological

obstacles

prevented the nationalist Vietnamese from taking such a step. On
the matter of a settlement in Laos and Cambodia, Zhou again showed
a willingness to have the hostilities in those two states disjoined
Zhang Shuguang, In the Shadow of Mao, p. 361.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 105.
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 263.
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from the issues in Vietnam. He further offered to recognize the
royal governments of Laos and Cambodia and adhered to a policy of
nonintervention in the internal affairs of the two royal states.
But he conditioned his demand upon a guarantee that would prevent
other power from establishing military bases in the two states.
Mendens-France assured Zhou that he would promote direct FrancoVietminh talks and that there should be no American bases in Laos
and Cambodia.At the end of the talk, Zhou agreed, at his French
host's

request,

to persuade

the Vietminh

to concede on

the

partition line, but he also stressed that the concession should be
made on the term of reciprocity.
At Geneva, Zhou's personal diplomacy was not limited to the "big
powers" game. He also paid considerable attention to the feelings
of the Laotians and the Cambodians. On June 20, Zhou had talks with
Phoui Sasanikone, the head of the Laotian delegation; and Tep Phan,
the Cambodian Foreign Secretary. The representatives of the two
small countries expressed their demands for an end to insurgent
activities within their territories, and also said that if Vietminh
forces withdrew from Laos and Cambodia, they would maintain neutral
in the Cold War. Their positions clearly conformed with one of
Zhou's ends at Geneva: to prevent foreign power's military bases
from the two states.^®® Zhou reiterated his pledge to Tep Phan and
Phoui Sasanikone that after an armistice was signed, the Vietminh
Ibid., p. 305.
Ibid, and Cable, p. 105.
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 68.
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who presently were on their territories would be withdrawn. The
next day, Zhou put the Cambodians and Laotians in touch with the
Vietminh delegation in his villa at. Le Grand Mont-Fleuri
Zhou's role now appeared salient on the part of the Vietminh.
He himself was well aware that the final effort was to persuade his
communist ally, the Vietminh, to accept the partition line proposed
by the French and to withdraw its military "volunteers" from Laos
and Cambodia. In view of Pham's wavering character, Zhou decided to
approach Ho Chi Minh, the supreme leader of the Vietminh.
To persuade the Vietminh to make necessary concessions on truce
terms, Zhou could play upon the influence which China had exerted
on the Vietnamese historically, culturally, and geographically. In
1954, however, it was by no means an easy game that anyone could
play well. If anyone could play it, it was Zhou whom James Cable
described as "an extremely adroit negotiator with an astonishing
capacity for work."^®®
Over the centuries, the Chinese had influenced the Vietnamese
culturally; but at times, they also used force against their small
neighbor. Sino-Vietnamese relations were characterized by a mixture
of friendship, suspicion, and hostility. In modern times, China had
retained much of its traditional attitude toward the Vietnamese,
which asserted that Vietnam should follow China's lead in foreign
affairs. At the same time, however, it had to consider Vietnamese
nationalism. As Hinton put it, "the attitude of the Vietnamese
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 265.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954." p. 86.
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toward the Chinese was a mixture of admiration, envy, resentment,
and fear."^®® In 1954, the interaction between China and North
Vietnam at Geneva again reflected their traditional relations.
On July 3-5, Zhou met Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the
Commander in Chief, PAVN, in a Chinese border city, Liuzhou. They
discussed the Indochina war and its prospects. Chinese documents
revealed that Zhou explained to both Vietminh leaders that the Viet
-minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or
accepting peace immediately, with an option of resuming the fight
later."It would be wise," he stressed, "for the Vietminh to
cease hostilities with the French and consolidate power in the
Vietminh-controlled areas, and look for other opportunities at a
later date."^®^ As to the French policy, Zhou said to Ho and Giap,
"We should do our best to support the Mendes-France Government, so
that we can prevent the war-like elements in France from sabotaging
[it]. This would be certainly beneficial to both of us."^®^ In term
of Laos and Cambodia, he tried to convince Ho and Giap that "only
through peaceful means, would we win over those two small countries
on our side; the military pressure certainly push them to look to
the United States. If that occurred, the war would be escalated in

Harold Hinton, China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam.
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 10.
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 67.
Ibid., p. 68.
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I n d o c h i n a H o himself took Zhou's advice and agreed to accept
the partition line proposed by the French and to withdraw Vietminh
troops from Laos and Cambodia. Both sides worked to conclude a
document, called the "July 5 document", which stipulated that "the
guidelines adopted at the Geneva Conference should be active and
flexible; and they are (1) to continue proposing the partition line
at the 15th parallel on the part of the Vietminh. If the French
insisted on their claim at the 18th parallel, the Vietminh would
consider to retreat to the 17th parallel; and (2) to accept the
French proposal, i.e. to have the questions in Laos and Cambodia
disjoined from the issue in Vietnam.
During his talks with Ho and Giap, Zhou gave his'opinion, saying
that "the victory at the Dien Bien Phu campaign did not mean a sign
that the Vietminh could control the military situation in Vietnam.
In fact, the French still occupied vital strategic and urban areas
including Hanoi and Haipong.^®^ Zhou believed that the U.S. had
been seeking any opportunity to intervene in Indochina. An unending
war would be detrimental to the new Vietminh regime. Considering
the complex and

uncertain situation,

the most

favorable and

attainable plan was to realize the cessation of hostilities on
terms acceptable to both sides. The French forces would retreat to
the south of the partition line, and the Vietminh would move to the
north and consolidate its power base in the areas adjoining to
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 257.
Ibid.
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China's border. In Zhou's view, "when the French troops were no
longer in Vietnam, the Vietminh would be able to unify the whole
nation.^®® As a return to Ho's compromise, Zhou once again made the
pledge, "China will be a reliable rear for the Vietminh in its
future struggle for national independence and

unification."^®'

During this meeting, Zhou used persuasion and compromise with his
Vietnamese comrades. As Harold Hinton put it, Zhou obtained Ho Chi
Minh's agreement to go along with the general peace plan at Geneva.
For his satisfaction, a feeling of irritation and frustration on
the part of the Vietminh was not too high a price to pay. The
Vietminh

could

be

squared

with

economic

and

military

assistance.
On July 10, Zhou returned to Geneva via Moscow, where he had
talks with the Soviet leaders. The latter said that Mendes-France's
difficulties were not only with Dulles but even with the French
integrationist, such as Robert Schuman, an influential French
politicians, who bitterly opposed Mendes-France and his government.
Moreover, in early July, Dulles condemned the French and British
"for efforts to conclude peace at any price."*®® All this had put
Mendes-France in an awkward position. The Soviet leaders clearly
endorsed Zhou's plan to end the war in Indochina and to have the
Vietminh concede on peace terms.
^®® Ibid.
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 46.
Hinton, Communist China in World politics, p. 254.
^®® Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 112.
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Considering the uncertainty of the French politics, Zhou flew
back to Geneva from Moscow, and had a long, frank, and patient talk
with Pham Van Dong on the night of July 12. At the outset, he was
undecided and even suspicious at Zhou's analysis and explanations.
Zhou had to show him the "July 5 document" and, as the spokesman of
the CPSU, CCP, and VCP, insisted that Pham follow the official line
written in the "July 5 document". At last, Pham agreed to talk
Mendes-France the next day and to discuss the new offer that the
Vietminh would accept the partition line and withdraw its remaining
"voluntary personnel" from both Cambodia and Laos."^°° Pham's final
concession on the issues ushered in the hope that the discussion on
Indochina would possibly reach agreement on the four fundamentally
controversial questions. By now, all the contending sides agreed to
cease fighting and moved to each other's regrouping areas, as the
agreement stipulated.
By July 18, however, the Indochina Conference had not reached a
resolution on the composition of the international supervisory
commission. As mentioned early, the Western powers and its allies
insisted that a neutral nation should be a non-communist; while
China and the Vietminh supported by the Soviet Union rejected the
Western opinion. On the afternoon of the 18th, Zhou proposed to
Eden that India, Canada, and Poland should provide the members of
the supervisory commissions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This
combination of one neutral, one western, and one communist state
seemed as clearly responsive to each one's requirements as it was
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 262.
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altogether unexpected.As Eden later wrote that, "from that
moment, the tangled ends of the discussion [at Geneva] began to
sort themselves out."^°^ Zhou's suggestion brought him the great
honor and respect at Geneva so that he was considered as a man of
considerable intelligence, imagination and initiative.^®^
After seven weeks of negotiations, the Indochina Conference
finally produced the result that Zhou desired; the termination of
the war in Indochina and the exclusion of the Americans from that
area. In retrospect

it was true that Zhou made considerable

contributions to the settlement of the Indochina issues at the
Geneva Conference. Among the issues discussed, i.e. the cessation
of hostilities; the partition line in Vietnam; the neutralization
of Laos and Cambodia; and the composition of the international
supervisory commission, he intervened with direct efforts to solve
all of them, i.e. to persuade Ho Chi Minh to make compromise on the
partition line, to have the Vietminh withdraw its forces from Laos
and Cambodia, to obtain the guarantee from Laos and Cambodia of
their neutralization, and to settle the tangled question of the
supervisory commission by imaginatively initiating a tripartite
membership for international supervision and control. In making
this proposal, Zhou acted in the spirit of compromise. That was
obviously Zhou's approach at Geneva, which he strongly urged other
participants to share.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 119.
Eden, Full Moon, p-. 159.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 119.
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At three o'clock that afternoon of July 21, after frantic
activities at all levels, the Geneva Conference started its last
plenary session. The heads of five delegations met in the meeting
hall: Eden, Molotov, Zhou Enlai, Mendes-France, and Pham Van Dong
(Bedell Smith and Tran Van Do, the deputy from South Vietnam were
absent). At that moment, the Geneva Indochina Conference, after
many compromises and complicated negotiations, finally produced the
three agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. These three agreements and the "Final Declaration of the
Conference" together formed the "Geneva Accords," as they were
later called. The "Final Declaration" was signed by the most of the
states which participated the Conference. But the United States did
not sign on the accords. On July 23, Secretary Dulles stated that
"the United States ... did not become a party to the conference
results. But in accordance with the U.N. Charter, the United States
would not use force to overthrow the settlements."^®^ The "Final
Declaration" committed all concerned "to respect the sovereignty,
the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam" and "to refrain from interference in their
internal affairs"; it outlined the basis of an eventual political
settlement, stipulating that the people of Indochina were expected
to hold national free elections within a specified period of time
to achieve democracy and freedom inside each other homelands
To the Chinese, the importance of the "Geneva Accords" lies in that
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 352.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, p. 123.
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"the three states of Indochina were prohibited from entering into
alliances, establishing foreign military bases and building up
unqualified military defense."^"® These documents concluded at the
Geneva Conference seemed the only way to meet conflicting political
requirements, to end hostilities in Indochina and to preserve the
peace of the world by saving face.^°'' Accordingly, the first Indo
china war, which had lasted eight years and which was the focus of
the East-West relations in 1954, at last ended with the interna
tional accords.
In retrospect, the Geneva Conference and its accords as well
scored some results, despite their weaknesses. As Lord Avon, a
British diplomat, later wrote, "The Geneva Conference fell short
but not by so wide a margin.

As they were defined, the Geneva

Accords actually ended hostilities, underwrote the independence and
neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and created a temporary political
equilibrium in a partitioned Vietnam which facilitated the French
withdrawal. This conclusion resulted in nearly one million refugees
being able to return to their homeland(s).
Faith in the applicability of the Geneva Agreements, however,
was from the outset challenged by the attitude of the Americans.
Then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower referred to the Vietnamese
cease-fire agreement as that "terrible agreement at Geneva." He

Ibid., p. 8.
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 124.
Kenneth Young, ed.. The 1954 Geneva Conference; Indochina
and Korea. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 3.
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noted the "element of tragedy in an agreement put great nxunber of
people under Communist domination."^®® But Bedell Smith, a U.S.
general and diplomat who attended the Geneva Conference, repeated
an expression which Eden had used at the conclusion of the Geneva
Conference: The cease-fire agreements were "the best we could have
possibly obtained under the circumstances, in which the French
wanted to pull out of Indochina at almost any price. It is well to
remember that diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the table
what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."^^® On July 22,
the French National Assembly favorably voted to support MendesFrance's policy and the settlements on Indochina by a significant
majority: 462 votes for and 13 votes against.
Reactions from the three Communist countries - North Vietnam,
China and the Soviet Union - were favorable and enthusiastic. On
July 22, Ho Chi Minh issued an appeal to his people and forces,
emphasizing "the great diplomatic victory at Geneva.

Moscow

reiterated its peaceful intentions in foreign affairs; and Pravda's
editorial expressed the view that "the political importance of the
participation of the PRC in the solving of urgent international
problems has become clear at present as never before.^^^ Beijing's

Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday
and Company, 1963), p. 211.
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 353.
Ibid., p. 355.
Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 324.
Ibid., p. 325.
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tone was laid upon the success of peaceful negotiations and the
"major power" status of China at the Geneva Conference.
It was understandable that Beijing was pleased with the result
of the settlement in Indochina, because the area of Vietnam above
the 17th parallel was now under the communist control, no foreign
military bases would be allowed in Indochina and Laos and Cambodia
were guaranteed their neutral status in foreign affairs by the
Geneva accords. With the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the
settlement of the Indochina war in 1954, China obtained a peaceful
environment and began its large-scale domestic reconstruction. On
the part of Beijing's diplomacy, Zhou then urged to adopt the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the foundation for China's
foreign policy. He noted, "International disputes could be resolved
through negotiations, provided nations at large were sincerely
anxious for peace.
Zhou himself was pleased with the result. He attained his basic
objectives at the Geneva Conference: to terminate Indochina war
near the China's border and to prevent foreign bases and forces
from being established in Indochina. On July 22, Zhou gave a dinner
to Pham Van Dong and the representatives of South Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos at his villa. This was one of the occasions for which food
was flown in from China. At the dinner table, Zhou toasted to each
delegation present. His toast unexpectedly made friends with
Laotian, Cambodian, and even South Vietnam, but dismayed his ally.
North Vietnam. On the way back to Beijing, his aides asked the
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 66.
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premier to reflect on his Geneva experience. Zhou commented as
follows:
(1). The solution of all international disputes can
always be based on negotiations. As long as both sides
have good will and understand each other, no matter how
complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its
solution.
(2). After a formal meeting, activities including private
contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have
a frank exchange of views, probe into each other's inten
tions, negotiate and reach detailed agreements. There are
the practical and fine methods used to resolve problems.
(3). To find effective solutions always requires mutual
understanding, accommodating each other's needs, yielding
to the other's reasonable demands, and showing considera
tion for each other's interests, so as to seek a common
ground for an agreement. If neither side can agree on
certain issues, they ought to be shelved for the time
being. This is what compromise is all about....
(4). When we deal with small and weak nations we must pay
special attention to their face [jnian zi]; in other
words, we must never hurt their national pride. As a hig
power, we could understand this without difficulties
At the 1954 Geneva Conference, his proposals and his approach to
international issues demonstrated that Zhou pursued PRC's security
and legitimacy through diplomacy. Even in the mid-1950s, when
Beijing felt isolated and contained due to the United States nonrecognition policy, Zhou still insisted on achieving legitimate
interests of China in a manner consistent with accepted standards
of international rules and norms. In this sense, Zhou made his
debut in international theater of diplomacy and scored a personal
triumph by impressing most of the diplomats whom he met at Geneva.
The Soviet leaders, including V.M. Molotov, considered Zhou a
bright, flexible diplomat with a balanced judgment. James Cable, a
British diplomat, later recalled that "Zhou had great charm and
Shuguang Zhang, In the Shadow of Mao;, p. 361.
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vitality and was always completely at ease." Jean Chauvel, a French
diplomat at Geneva, commended on "Zhou's intelligence, education,
incisiveness and good manners." Humphrey Trevelvan, the British
Charge d' affairs in Beijing, thought that "by any standards, Zhou
was a remarkable • man [and an] extremely adroit negotiator with
immense energy.

Anthony Eden admitted that "Zhou was poised and

firm in negotiation and worked for the fine point.

Even Dean

Acheson was reported to speak Zhou as "the ablest diplomat in the
world, not excepting Mr. Churchill.
Apart from this high praise from world-level diplomats, it has
to be admitted that Chinese official tributes to Zhou and his
diplomacy are voluminous as well as sometimes irrelevant. Given
these eulogistic words about Zhou Enlai, people might have to
question what the attributes of Zhou's diplomacy remain at Geneva,
and how we should assess his diplomacy objectively?

These quotations were cited from The Geneva Conference of
1954 on Indochina by James Cable, p. 86.
Eden, Full Circle, p. 138.
Wilson, Zhou Enlai, p. 194.
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Chapter IV.
An Assessment of Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy-

Based on the materials we have at present, we can assess Zhou En
lai's diplomacy at Geneva. Yet, it is not easy to make a balanced
assessment for several elements. Two of them, however, seem more
obvious. First of all, it is still too early to expect a definitive
account of Zhou's diplomacy; i.e. to assign his true significance
to the Geneva Conference of 1954 because of the restricted access
to the Vietnamese, Russian, and even Chinese documents. Much of the
evidence needed is still not available. It will take a long time
before the surviving docximents from Vietnam, the former USSR, and
China would be available to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the
motives and the conduct of the principal participants including
Zhou himself.
The second factor is related to the niimerous books, journals,
and articles about Zhou's diplomacy. These writings have provided
both laymen and scholars of history with useful information. On the
one hand, there is certain amount of credibility in most of the
writings, although they contain various controversial interpreta
tions. But on the other hand, there are instances where an author
misinterpreted the evidence to substantiate his subjective ideas.
Interpretations of the available documents are always needed, yet
the drawing of conclusions will demand particular objectivity. For
example, since the legacies of the Cold .War waned, controversies
have arisen from the different interpretations of the former
allies. In the late 1970s, Vietnamese papers, both by scholars and
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officials, charged that Zhou betrayed the revolutionary struggle of
the peoples of Indochina and sacrificed their legitimate interests
when he agreed to the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia and the cease
-fire areas in Vietnam in a "secret deal" with Bidault at the 1954
Geneva ConferenceHistorically speaking, this is inaccurate. As
a matter of fact, on June 17 1954, Zhou's first approach was made
to Sir Anthony Eden, not to Georges Bidault, the Foreign Minister
of the politically paralysed France. When he saw Bidault on that
day, Zhou did not, as seen from Hanoi, concede a point on the
matters discussed. At that time, Bidault would in any case have
been personally unwilling to accept Zhou's proposal and, because of
the fall of his government, he was unable to.^^°
Despite these problems, there are still notable academic efforts
made by scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese. Based on the
historical materials and theoretical approach(es), these scholars
have worked on the analyses of Zhou's diplomacy from his style to
his influence at the Geneva Conference. For example, historian
Melvin Gurtov wrote that Zhou was good at combining the conduct of
diplomacy with the use of force in world politics. He accepted that
the Korean conflict was paralleled by the Panmumjom armistice, the
Indochina war by the Geneva Accords, and the subsequent Taiwan
Strait crisis by Sino-American talks."By making use of the
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, p. 122.
Ibid., p. 98.
22^ Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, p. 163. The U.S.-China
Talks started at Geneva in 1955, moved to Warsaw in 1957, and ended
in 1970. Ambassador Kenneth Young called it "the longest establish-

negotiation table," Gurtov argued, "as an extension of the battle
front and of diplomacy as the handmaiden of protracted duel, Zhou
accelerated the trend toward neutrality in Asia. His flexible
diplomacy at Geneva echoed a general satisfaction and, to some
extent, pro-Chinese sentiments among the Asian states
Harold Hinton, a scholar of foreign affairs, has argued that
whereas the settlement in Indochina was his preferred goal, Zhou
performed very ably and effectively. But he would have made no
measurable progress in Indochina if he had not been supported by
the Russians.Hinton believed that "there was no assurance that
Beijing would be invited to future conferences like the 1954 Geneva
Conference, in spite of its insistence that it should have a say in
the settlement of all major international issues.
However, Robert Randle, who has written the most comprehensive
book on the Geneva Conference, disagrees with Hinton's analysis. He
has argued that "Premier Zhou played an important, even a crucial
role in the negotiations at Geneva. The People's Republic of China,
in appearance as well as in fact, was a great power and a peace
maker in Asia."^^^ He adds that there was no evidence that Zhou
sought to do more than very effectively demonstrate China's role as

ed permanent floating diplomatic game in modern history." Young,
Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 3.
Ibid.
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 254.
Ibid.
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 549.
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a great power and the need for consultations with Beijing in the
settlement of any East Asian problems. Finally, Randle concludes
that "Zhou and [his] delegation's participation, performance, and
achievements constituted a gain of a very high order at the Geneva
Conference of 1954."^^®
K.C. Chen, a scholar on 1954 Indochina War, placed his analysis
on the style of Zhou's diplomacy at Geneva. He argued that Zhou's
style was not that of senseless resistance toward opponents' views.
Even if he did not say "yes", he never ran the risk of losing any
chance to find the common ground. In fact, Zhou expressed a strong
sense of the need for compromise and reconciliation which he had
urged other participants to share [at Geneva]
Ronald Keith, a Canadian scholar of Zhou's diplomacy, wrote in
1989 that in the Cold War context of 1954, Zhou scored notable
points against Dulles's diplomacy at Geneva and his peaceful co
existence offensive gained momentum after the Geneva Conference.
But ultimately Zhou could not arrest the United States move toward
collective defence in [Southeast] Asia.^^®
Recently, a few Chinese scholars who completed their doctoral
studies in the United States, have made notable contributions to
the research on Zhou's diplomacy. For example, the scholar of
political science Shao Guokang considered that the qualities of
balanced, pragmatism, and skilful articulation of means and ends
Ibid,, p. 551.
K. C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 315.
Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, p. 80.
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invariably characterized Zhou's approach to international disputes.
He argued that Zhou's sense of moderation and pragmatic attitude
made it possible for him to work with the Geneva major powers to
reconcile their policy differences in 1954, i.e. the application of
the principle of peaceful settlement in Indochina was to lay a
basis upon which a more grand structure of an "area of peace" in
Southeast Asia would be built.Zhai Qiang, a historian, thought
that Zhou was a shrewd practitioner of diplomacy of the possible at
Geneva and he excelled in playing British and French realism off
against the rigidity and inflexibility of Dulles's Cold War diplo
macy through uniting with all possible forces to isolate China's
most dangerous adversary.
Even though there are various weaknesses in these scholars'
arguments, their efforts are helpful in understanding Zhou and his
diplomacy at Geneva. Yet, this thesis asserts that the assessment
ought to start with an analysis of Zhou's perception and approach
prior to and during the Geneva Conference.
First of all, Zhou, remarking on the political and ideological
differences between states, perceived the world as an international
system with various possibilities and conflicts. Based on his view
on world politics, he endorsed the idea that China should align
with the Soviet camp within the Cold War context, because they
shared the similar ideology and system of government. But, at the
Shao Guokang, "Zhou's Diplomacy," p. 502, CQ., no, 107,
(September 1986).
Zhai Qiang, "China and the Geneva Conference," p. 122, CO.,
no. 299, (April 1992).
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same time, he stressed that China should through diplomacy obtain
its own security and legitimate interests according to the doctrine
of "peaceful coexistence". Because of his faith in diplomacy, since
1953, Zhou echoed the theme that the use of force to settle inter
national disputes was fruitless and that the age of the settlement
of international disputes by negotiations was definitely here to
stay.^^^ Shortly thereafter he hardened his efforts to conclude a
peaceful resolution on Indochina, During the Geneva Conference, he
was realistic and flexible in approaching to the British, French,
and Vietminh delegates. Zhou persuaded the Vietminh to accept the
demarcation line proposed by the French, while at the same time
trying to advising the French to make a relevant concession. As he
said to Mendes-France: "Each side would need to step towards the
other . , ,. which is not to say that each has an equal number of
steps to make,"^^^ This case was a fine example of reciprocity. The
French took the advantage of saving face because the Vietminh would
have to accept French proposal. On the part of Ho and Pham, their
concessions allowed the Vietminh to have the French troops withdraw
from North Vietnam, to obtain Beijing's, even Moscow's, military
and economic assistance, and to gain a kind of legitimacy from the
neutral states in Asia. Thus, Zhou's debut at Geneva confirmed that
he conformed himself to the standard norms and principles of modern
diplomacy: persuasion and reciprocity.
Secondly, Zhou recommended a compromise approach of "seeking
Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 324.
Wilson, Zhou Enlai - A Biography, p. 196.
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common ground while reserving differences" {qiutong cunyi), From
May 14 to July 18, the discussions on the role and membership of
the international supervisory commission remained a thorny problem.
Molotov proposed four neutral nations as members - Czechoslovakia,
Poland, India, and Pakistan. But the non-communist states were
opposed to it. Eden proposed five Colombo nations, which Molotov
rejected. South Vietnam suggested the United Nations, from which
China was excluded at American insistence, but Zhou dismissed this
idea. The two sides eloquently but stubbornly disagreed with each
other and no agreement was reached until July 18. A solution seemed
unlikely. But on that afternoon, Zhou suddenly proposed to his
allies and opponents to find the common ground. He recommended
India, Canada, and Poland as the members of the international
commission for supervision. His proposal was accepted unanimously
and he too received great credit. James Cable, a British diplomat,
went so far to say "When Eden went bumbling on about the Colombo
Powers, he was rescued by Zhou Enlai."^^^ Zhou's approach made it
possible for him to work with Britain and France, which disagreed
with the U.S. on Indochina, to reconcile their policy differences
and to work out an mutually accepted result. In addition, during
the Geneva Conference, Zhou's personal diplomacy covered his sixtytwo talks, in both plenary sessions and private contacts, with the
heads of the delegations. He even made effort to approach to John
Dulles, the head of U.S. delegation. In this sense, Zhou appeared
a revolutionary devoted to Chinese independence and a realistic
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 133.
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diplomat committed to international law and the standard norms of
diplomacy.
Thirdly, Zhou was poised and firm in dealing with the problem of
balancing national interest and ideological affinity. In reality,
ideology and national interests can, and do, go hand in hand and
are generally inextricably intertwined. As Vidya Dutt, an Indian
scholar of foreign affairs, put it, "Ideology can not function in
a vacuum and national interests are not totally unrelated to the
ideology one profess. Ideology by itself does not provide any cut
and dried answer.

During the mid-1950s, Zhou spent little time

making ideological statements. He expected to create a working
atmosphere when negotiating with the western diplomats. At that
time, his statements always aimed at generating expectations of
future co-operation, i.e. according to his terminology, "finding
the common ground and reserving the differences." In pursuit of
China's security and legitimate interests, he insisted that most
conflicts of interest between nation-states could be settled by
negotiations, reconciliation and peaceful solution.All of this
revealed that Zhou sensibly had a vision to recognize the realistic
relations between diplomacy and force, alliance and independence,
and international legitimacy and revolution.
At the Geneva Conference, Zhou advised the Vietminh to settle
the conflict through negotiations with the French as well as with
Vidya P. Dutt, China and the World - An Analysis of
Communist China's foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A Praeger,
Publisher, 1966), p. 27.
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 68.
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Laos and Cambodia. On June 27, Zhou asserted that "revolution can
not be exported, and at the same time outside interference with the
expressed will of the people should not be permitted.

He added

that people of any state had the right to select their system of
government without interference from the outside. His statement had
special meaning regarding Beijing's policy toward Indochina and the
Southeast Asian states at large. Considering the three political
forces in world politics - the Western allies, the Eastern camp,
and the neutral, non-aligned states, Zhou urged the peaceful co
existence as the basis of state-to-state relations. With the faith
in "peace diplomacy, " he worked hard to persuade the Vietminh to go
along with the general peace plan concluded at Geneva. As Wang Bing
-nan, then a senior aide to Zhou, told the French On May 18: "We
are not here to sustain the point of view of the Vietminh, we are
here

to

exert

all

efforts

towards

the

re-establishment

of

peace.
From the analysis of Zhou's diplomatic debut at Geneva, it is
not exaggerating to say that he was well aware of the core tenets
of

diplomacy:

persuasion,

compromise,

reciprocity

and,

when

necessary, the use of force in order to achieve diplomatic goals.
He successfully impressed the world-level diplomats at Geneva and
played an important, in some cases, even a crucial role in the
final settleinent of the Indochina issue.

Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 266.
Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks, p. 22.
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Epilogue

As Mao's most influential and most brilliant advisor on foreign
affairs, Zhou retained his authority and exerted huge impact on
Beijing's foreign relations until his death in 1976. During his
tenure in this capacity, which lasted for a quarter of a century,
Zhou logged more air miles than any other single Asian diplomat,
visiting most capitals on all continents except Latin and North
America, spending more time in Africa than any other ranking world
statesmen, and surviving many a diplomatic duel.^^® During his
longtime state activities, Zhou impressed people at all levels. His
approach to international diplomacy was diligent, subtle, flexible,
and persuasive. However, Zhou's diplomatic debut at Geneva, for the
reasons relating to China's strength, its domestic power structure,
and Zhou's intellectual concept, should not be overestimated.
First, considering China's limited power at that time, it was
impossible for Zhou to play a dominant role during the Geneva
Conference. Actually, both Britain and the Soviet Union, though
pursuing different ends, played undisputed role in the convening
the Geneva Conference of 1954 in order to relax the crises in Asia.
Without their efforts, the Geneva Conference would never have been
held, much less permitted to end with even the limited measure of
agreement actually achieved. As ambassador Young later wrote that
"the British and Soviet heads of the delegations [at Geneva] served
as alternating co-chairmen who mediated the critical disputes to
produce the final compromises. Without them the conference would
Young, Negotiating with the Communist China, p. 470.
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have collapsed.
Second, given the power structure or power division, Zhou never
had full freedom to assert his diplomacy. Although he was the lead
ing spokesman of Beijing's foreign policy, Zhou needed to consult
with his colleagues, especially Mao, on the key foreign policies.
In 1954, Beijing's policy toward Indochina was the result of the
collective decision of the CCP. True, Mao and Zhou were the most
influential personalities in handling all foreign policies. But
when the big tv.;o clashed each other on the major decisions, Zhou
had no option but followed Mao's lead through modifying his own
departures at his most effort. As Wang Bingnan recalled that Zhou's
approach to the VJest and his proposal at Geneva had obtained Mao's
full support and trust.
Third, Zhou Enlai was an astute and well-travelled diplomat. He
developed many qualities of his diplomacy with practice and the
greatest part of the necessary knowledge were acquired from his
whole career as a Chinese revolutionary striving for China's safety
and independence. But Zhou's knowledge of world affairs and, his
theoretical basis of diplomacy in particular should be viewed
appropriately. He prized the principles of international relations
- national self-determination, sovereign rights, reciprocity and
equality among nations. As the principles of international actions,
these ideas are the end result of the modern history of diplomacy

Young, ed. , The 1954 Geneva Conference: Indochina and
Korea, p. 1.
Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks, p. 10.
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as developed in the Western world; and they are as honored in the
West as they are by the Chinese. Clearly, these Western principles
could serve Zhou's goal of promoting China's big power status and
protecting its weakness at that time. But Zhou's views on world
politics revealed that he was a pointedly Marxist-Leninist and he
was greatly influenced by Leninist doctrine on diplomacy. He paid
little attention to the Western liberal theories on international
relations, such as the roles of the international organization(s),
foreign trade, public opinion and etc. He also appeared extremely
sensitive to unequal and nonreciprocal treatment when negotiating
the foreign diplomats of both East and West. Such a sense had
nothing to do v;ith peaceful coexistence which he endorsed.
Nevertheless, it is by no means my intention to minimize Zhou's
influential impact on China's diplomacy by exposing his weaknesses.
We can inherit a great legacy from Zhou's diplomacy in both theory
and practice. True, he was well aware of the classical simplicity
of bilateral negotiations which remained the core of diplomacy and
he keenly grasped the balance of power diplomacy when negotiating
the foreign diplomats. But simply repeating what he said and what
he did will be not only sluggish but also risky in our reflection
upon our foreign policy. True, many of the weaknesses of Zhou's
diplomacy arose from the historical context in which he developed
his intellectual concept on world politics. Yet, these "objective
conditions" should not prevent us from calling into question the
wisdom of certain aspects of his diplomacy. George Kennan wrote, "A
nation v/hich excuses its own failure by the sacred untouchableness
95

of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster.

If

we excuse Zhou's "class struggle" perception and his weakness of
the theories of diplomacy, which certainly resulted from the "Cold
War" context, for the sake of his political holiness, it supposes
that we will excuse ourselves for not making novel, creative and
imaginative progress in the future. China, the young Chinese in
general, can not rest on the laurels with which he was crowned by
the diplomatic elite of the world. In the rapidly changing world,
communications, technology, trade, and the influence of Western
ideas have v/elded the entire world into the proximity that would
normally contribute to the formation of a global village. Under
such new circumste.nces, any stagnation in thinking or action will
inevitably result in retrogression, ignorance, and possible fiascos
in the future.

George Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950. (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1984), p. 73.
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